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A Structural Approach as
Antidiscrimination Mandate:
Locating Employer Wrong
Tristin K. Green 60 Vand. L. Rev. 849 (2007)
A structural approach to employment discrimination law
seeks to impose an obligation on employers not to facilitate
discriminatory decisionmaking in the workplace. Scholars across
disciplines agree that a structural approach is a crucial element of
an effective antidiscrimination law. Existing law fails to account for
the ways in which bias manifests subtly in day-to-day workplace
decisionmaking, or for the influence of organizational context on
that decisionmaking. But the future of a structural approach
depends, in part, on its normative foundation. Without sufficient
normative underpinning, a structural approach is unlikely to gain
traction in the public or in the courts.
In this Article, Professor Tristin Green makes the normative
case for a structural approach. She argues that a structural
approach sits within the core of employment discrimination law,
imposing costs on employers for their own wrongs against
individuals in the workplace. At the same time, she challenges the
emerging view that all (or almost all) antidiscrimination law is
inherently and exclusively distributive. That view, she argues, is
both mistaken and dangerous, for it casts aside the longstanding
fault-based component of the nondiscrimination obligation.





I. DEFINING A STRUCTURAL APPROACH .................................. 854
A. The Problem of Structural Discrimination:
Implicit Bias and Organizational Context .............. 854
B. A Structural Approach to Employment
Discrimination Law: Seeking Change in
Organizational Context ........................................... 857
II. RECLAIMING THE NORMATIVE CORE OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW .................................. 865
A. A Meaningful Normative Divide: Costs
and Employer W rong ............................................... 866
B. Locating Employer Wrong in Existing
Employment Discrimination Law ........................... 873
1. Disparate Treatment Liability ..................... 874
2. Disparate Impact Liability ........................... 875
3. Reasonable Accommodation Liability .......... 880
III. SITUATING A STRUCTURAL APPROACH ................................. 883
A. Structural Discrimination as a
W orkplace W rong ..................................................... 885
B. Structural Discrimination as an
E m ployer W rong ...................................................... 889
C. Crossing into Accommodation ................................. 900
C O N CLU SIO N ................................................................................... 903
Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School. I owe thanks to Michelle Adams, Rachel
Arnow-Richman, Samuel Bagenstos, Carl Coleman, Rachel Godsil, Mitu Gulati, Erik Lillquist,
Solangel Maldonado, Frank Pasquale, Susan Sturm, and Charles Sullivan for valuable
conversations and comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also to Pinar Ozgu for excellent research




Employment discrimination law is at a crossroads. A wealth of
interdisciplinary research suggests that the problem for the future of
workplace equality is subtle and "structural" rather than overt and
individual. Race, sex, and other protected group characteristics will
continue to factor into employment decisions, but the decisions are
more likely to be driven by unconscious biases and stereotypes
operating within a facilitating organizational context than by
conscious animus operating in isolation. Recognizing that Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the mainstay of legal prohibition on
discrimination in employment, falls short of addressing the problem,
legal scholars have begun to formulate a new paradigm of regulation
that would impose an obligation on employers-through legal rights or
otherwise-to take structural measures to minimize discriminatory
bias in workplace decisionmaking. 1 This "structural approach" aims to
minimize discriminatory decisionmaking at the individual level and to
reduce unequal treatment in the workplace by pushing change at the
organizational level in work environments and decisionmaking
systems.
Over the past several years, however, a handful of scholars,
most notably Professor Samuel Bagenstos in his recent article The
Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, have
cautioned against using antidiscrimination law to target more subtle
forms of employment discrimination. 2 These critics do not dispute that
the problem of structural discrimination is a real one, nor do they
question the empirical foundation for or description of the problem.
Instead, the recent calls for caution, even retreat, stem from a single
underlying concern: that structural discrimination does not fit the
paradigmatic picture of discrimination as the product of a discrete
1. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 579 (2001); Tristin
K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate
Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003) [hereinafter Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics]; Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623
(2005) [hereinafter Green, Work Culture]; Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).
2. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 40 (2006) (arguing that a structural approach "may be asking
antidiscrimination law to do too much of the work of responding to society's inequalities").
Professor Bagenstos is the first to question directly the normative foundation for a structural
approach, but other scholars have argued that a structural approach, if pursued, should be
understood as a form of distributive justice, see, e.g., Julie Chi-hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law
in the Administrative State, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 407, and still others have attempted to
recast the problem of structural discrimination to fit the paradigmatic case of intentional or
animus-based exclusion as a way of gaining political traction, see, e.g., Michael Selmi, Sex
Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies in the Preservation of Male
Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1, 3-4 (2005) (arguing that recent class action
cases are "inconsistent with the emphasis on subtle discrimination").
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decision to exclude based on animus or irrational stereotype. By
diverging from the prevailing story, the argument goes, a structural
approach to employment discrimination law loses the normative force
that underlies an animus-based, individualized approach, and it is
therefore likely to face substantial political resistance.
My goals in this Article are twofold. First and foremost, I seek
to set the normative foundation for a structural approach to
employment discrimination law. Current pessimism concerning the
political viability of a structural approach, I argue, stems from the
assumption that a structural approach aims to impose costs on
employers for societal barriers to employment. That assumption is
mistaken. A structural approach to employment discrimination law
imposes costs on employers that are tied to employers' wrongs against
individuals in the workplace. An employer that facilitates
discriminatory workplace decisionmaking engages in the wrong of
treating individuals differently on the basis of protected group status
or characteristics and, perhaps more importantly, is worthy of fault for
its role in that wrong.
But the current pessimism concerning a structural approach is
rooted in a much broader challenge to employment discrimination law.
There is a growing sense in America that employment discrimination
laws have become little more than employer-funded subsidies. 3 A
recent line of legal scholarship adds fuel to this idea by seeking to
erase the normative divide between antidiscrimination and
accommodation mandates.4 Professor Bagenstos, for example, has
argued that accommodation mandates "target conduct that is
3. For example, in his 1996 presidential campaign, Republican candidate Bob Dole railed
against the creation of "special rights" for disadvantaged groups: "[Rights] ought not to be based
on gender or ethnicity or color or disability .... This is America. No discrimination.
Discrimination ought to be punished.... [Tihere ought to be equal opportunity ... [b]ut we cannot
guarantee equal results in America." Transcript of Second Televised Debate Between Clinton and
Dole, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1996, at B10, BIl.
For a fascinating account of conservative legal activism surrounding "special rights" in the
context of treaty-rights claims of Native American tribal nations, see Jeffrey R. Dudas, In the
Name of Equal Rights: "Special" Rights and the Politics of Resentment in Post-Civil Rights
America, 39 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 723 (2005).
4. E.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, "Accommodation, and the Politics
of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003); Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle,
Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 585
(2004) (arguing that the ADA reasonable accommodation requirement is normatively similar to
Title VII's requirements because it "remedies the avoidable workplace exclusion of a targeted
group"); see also Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 21 (2005) (arguing that
"[tlheorizing retaliation as a form of discrimination" is useful because it "requires moving beyond
discrimination law's current dominant framework of status-based differential treatment and




normatively similar to that targeted by antidiscrimination
[mandates]." 5 From this, he maintains that all discrimination laws-
or at least those that target anything other than the paradigmatic
animus-based discrimination-"must be justified in a manner that
takes full account of the incidence and distributive effects of their
implicit taxes and subsidies."6 And Professor Richard Ford takes a
similar position in his important new book, Racial Culture, when he
proposes a Coasian "joint-costs" analysis of antidiscrimination law
under which the benefits of the laws must always be weighed against
the costs imposed on employers and others.
7
The "tax and subsidy" scholarship appropriately highlights the
end-goal of social equality and the implications of costs imposed on
employers for attaining that goal, but it mistakes a common end-goal
for an identical normative underpinning and, in doing so, it casts aside
the longstanding fault-based component of much of employment
discrimination law. My second goal in this Article, therefore, is to
reclaim the normative core of employment discrimination law. I argue
that there is a meaningful normative distinction between
antidiscrimination and accommodation mandates, a distinction that
rests on the idea of correction for and prevention of wrongful acts in
the employment relationship but that does not limit such wrongful
acts to those based on affirmative animus or conscious reliance on
irrational stereotypes.
The Article is organized in three main Parts. In Part I, I
describe the problem of structural discrimination and define a
structural approach to employment discrimination law. Despite
extensive empirical work tying structural discrimination to continued
workplace subordination and segregation, legal scholars have been
surprisingly slow to theorize an approach to employment
discrimination law that would address structural forms of
discrimination. And those scholars who have attempted to define a
"structural approach" have done so without agreeing on a common
definition of the term. In this Part, I define a structural approach to
employment discrimination law, and I situate that definition within
broader social theory and distinguish it from other scholars' recent
uses of the term. A structural approach, as I understand it, is one that
identifies the facilitation of discriminatory bias in workplace
decisionmaking as a form of discrimination. It seeks to impose a
normative-and corresponding legal-obligation on employers not to
5. Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 922.
6. Id. at 921.
7. RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 172-79 (2005).
852 [Vol. 60:3:849
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facilitate discriminatory decisionmaking in the workplace. Defining a
structural approach in terms of employer obligation rather than in the
specifics of any particular regulatory scheme, I argue, allows for
exploration of how a structural approach fits within the normative
underpinnings of antidiscrimination law generally, before taking on
the implications of that fit for the contours of a regulatory framework.
In Parts II and III of the Article, I lay the normative foundation
for a structural approach. In Part II, I map the limits, the normative
core and political stress points, of employment discrimination law. I do
not dispute that the end-goal of all antidiscrimination law is social
equality, but I argue that antidiscrimination mandates carry greater
normative force than accommodation mandates, because
antidiscrimination mandates impose costs tied to employers' wrongs in
the workplace-rather than solely to society's wrongs or to the
employer wrong of contributing to social inequality.
Antidiscrimination mandates, accordingly, do not require the
distributive justification required of their accommodation-mandate
counterparts, a fact that makes the normative distinction between
antidiscrimination and accommodation important from a policy
perspective. Moreover, the divide that I mark as a normative matter
mirrors prevailing judicial interpretation of and political responses to
existing employment discrimination laws and, therefore, sets some
rough limits on the viability of employment discrimination laws in the
current political climate.
In Part III, I then situate a structural approach within this
broader normative framework by tying the costs imposed on
employers to employer wrong. Professor Bagenstos, I argue,
mistakenly assumes (as do others) that a structural approach expects
employers to bear the costs for society's wrongs. On the contrary,
employer facilitation of discriminatory bias in workplace
decisionmaking violates the longstanding norm against different
treatment in employment on the basis of protected characteristics, and
thus inflicts a moral wrong on individuals in the employment
relationship, regardless of whether the employer or the decisionmaker
acts with animus or intent to harm. But a structural approach to
employment discrimination law, by separating employer from
individual wrong, stands on even stronger normative footing. Under a
structural approach, individual actors need not be labeled "evil
discriminators" in order for employers to engage in wrongful
discrimination. Organizational decisions concerning workplace
policies, operations, culture, decisionmaking systems-the structures
that create the context in which individual perceptions and judgments
about merit are made-become the focus of inquiry, and the locus of
2007]
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employer wrong. With the normative foundation of a structural
approach to employment discrimination law in mind, legal actors-
judges, legislatures, agencies-should be comfortable holding
employers responsible for structural discrimination. And advocates of
reform should be more confident than scholars have thus far
acknowledged that their efforts to address structural discrimination
will gain the political traction needed for meaningful change.
I. DEFINING A STRUCTURAL APPROACH
There is substantial legal scholarship reviewing the social
science literature on implicit bias, much of which I have detailed in
earlier work.8 I provide only a brief review of this research here, before
turning to the project that has received much less scholarly attention:
that of theorizing an approach to employment discrimination law that
accounts for organizationally enabled forms of discrimination.
A. The Problem of Structural Discrimination: Implicit Bias and
Organizational Context
A well-developed social science literature on the operation of
human bias forms the empirical foundation for a structural approach
to employment discrimination law. This research shows that
discriminatory bias remains widespread, but that it is often implicit,
operating behind the scenes rather than at the forefront of
consciousness. The research also shows that the specific
organizational context in which individuals interact influences the
operation and effect of bias.
Perhaps the most well-known recent work on the pervasiveness
of unconscious bias is the Implicit Association Test ("IAT"), developed
by social psychologists Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin Banaji. 9
8. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 1, at 95-108.
9. Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Opposite of a Great Truth is Also True: Homage to Koan #7, in
PERSPECTIVISM IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE YIN & YANG OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 127, 130-38
(John T. Jost et al. eds., 2003) (describing the evolution of the author's research on implicit
attitudes); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition:
The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998). The IAT builds
on a long line of sequential priming and other studies measuring automatic associative
processes. See Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 242-43 (2002) (reviewing the empirical evidence for
automatic stereotyping and arguing that its reflexive nature does not place it beyond the
subject's control); Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and
Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 145 (2004) (describing the first series of
such studies). See generally Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1508
(2005).
854 [Vol. 60:3:849
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The IAT measures differences in the speed of cognitive processing in
order to identify biases not found in response to explicit questioning.
The basic idea behind the IAT is that our minds work faster when we
make stereotype-consistent associations and more slowly when we
fight against those stereotype-consistent associations. Available to
participants online, the IAT has amassed a wealth of data, and
compilation of that data reveals a substantial dissociation between
explicit and implicit beliefs and attitudes regarding race and sex. 10 In
other words, we may believe that we associate African Americans
equally with positive characteristics as with negative ones, but our
speed of processing reveals otherwise.
More significantly, studies also show a correlation between
scores on implicit attitude tests and behavior toward group members,
suggesting that these biases actually do translate into behavior.' In a
variety of contexts, researchers continue to document the substantial
effect of discriminatory biases, whether conscious or unconscious, on
real-world decisions. In one recent study, researchers responded to
over 1300 help-wanted advertisements with sets of four fictitious
The California Law Review recently published a symposium in which civil rights scholars
teamed with psychological scientists to explore some of the implications of implicit cognition
research for antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger,
Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006); Christine Jolls & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan
T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate
Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2006); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A
Behavioral Realist Revision of 'Affirmative Action", 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063 (2006); Gary Blasi &
John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy,
and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1119 (2006); R. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination and
Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1169 (2006). Although the IAT has
received the most attention of late as evidence of implicit biases, research suggesting that race
and gender biases continue to exist and to be acted upon, even in the absence of conscious
animus or intent, has been building in various forms for decades. See, e.g., PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986) (describing
some of the research on "aversive racism"). For a recent critique of the IAT research, see Gregory
Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1023 (2006).
10. See Dasgupta, supra note 9. The IAT is available on-line at https://
implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/.
11. See John F. Dovidio et al., Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction, 82
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62 (2002) (reporting experimental research that correlates
explicit bias to measures of verbal friendliness and self perception and implicit bias to nonverbal
friendliness and perception by others). See generally Kang & Banaji, supra note 9, at 1072-75
(describing studies revealing behavioral manifestations of bias); Kang, supra note 9, at 1514
("There is now persuasive evidence that implicit bias against a social category, as measured by
instruments such as the IAT, predicts disparate behavior toward individuals mapped to that
category."). Kang goes on to detail studies from a variety of contexts. Id. at 1514-28.
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resumes.1 2 Each resume was randomly assigned an African American-
sounding name (e.g., Jamal or Lakisha) or a white-sounding name
(e.g., Greg or Emily), and each set of four resumes included two
higher-qualified applicants and two lesser-qualified applicants.1 3 The
white-sounding names received fifty percent more callbacks than the
African American-sounding names, and while the better resume
assisted white-sounding names by thirty percent, the better resume
only minimally assisted African American-sounding names.'
4
The empirical research also reveals that discriminatory biases
are influenced by the specific contexts in which individuals operate.
15
Recent research using the IAT as a baseline, for example, shows that
the race of leadership figures can affect the degree of unconscious bias
exhibited in non-leaders. 16 Other studies suggest that demographic
makeup of the workplace as a whole and of work groups,' 7 salience of
alternative in-group and out-group boundaries,' 8 distribution of
12. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AMER. ECON.
REV. 991, 992 (2004). The researchers responded to advertisements in Boston and Chicago for
positions in sales, administrative support, clerical services, and customer services. Id. at 994.
13. Id. at 992, 994-95.
14. Id. at 997-98, 1000-01. The researchers found little evidence that other factors that
might be inferred from the names, such as social class, drove the results. Id. at 1007-09. Some of
the decisions to prefer white-sounding names over Black-sounding names undoubtedly could
have been consciously racist. Nonetheless, the expressed attitudes of whites have become
consistently more egalitarian over the past several decades, suggesting that at least some of the
decisions were driven by implicit bias. See HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN
AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS 120-21 (1997) (concluding that five decades of survey
data show a consistent trend toward expressed white acceptance of racial equality and
integration).
15. For a more detailed discussion of contextual influences on decisionmaking, drawing on
research on organizational wrongdoing in areas other than discrimination, see Tristin K. Green,
Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
659, 662-71 (2003).
16. See, e.g., Brian S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice,
81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 842 (2001) (finding that exposure to a Black experimenter
reduced whites' automatic racial bias).
17. See, e.g., VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN 139-42 (1999)
(describing research on the effect of minority group size on perception and evaluation in the
workplace); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1193-94 (1995)
(describing research on the consequences of a minority group member's being a "token" or "solo"
in a group). For a review of some of the research on the ways in which organizational context can
activate or suppress social psychological and cognitive processes, see Barbara F. Reskin, The
Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOc. 319 (2000).
18. See, e.g., Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Across Cultural Divides: The Value of a
Superordinate Identity, in CULTURAL DIVIDES: UNDERSTANDING AND OVERCOMING GROUP
CONFLICT 173 (Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller eds., 1999) (describing the effect of group
boundaries on bias and identifying group-based techniques for reducing intergroup bias). Based
on social cognition theories that stress the importance of social categorizing for individuals' self-
856
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power,' 9 institutional culture, 20 and information availability 2' all affect
the degree of unconscious bias and its effect on decisionmaking.
The term "structural discrimination" brings these critical
insights on the operation of discriminatory bias together and identifies
a form of discrimination that involves the interplay between
individuals and the larger organizational environments in which they
work.22 Discrimination under this view becomes more than a problem
of bias in isolation at discrete moments of formal decisionmaking; it
becomes a problem of the workplace structures and environments that
facilitate bias in the workplace on a day-to-day basis. 23
B. A Structural Approach to Employment Discrimination Law:
Seeking Change in Organizational Context
Building on this understanding of the underlying problem, a
"structural" approach to employment discrimination law aims to
minimize discriminatory bias in everyday workplace decisionmaking
by triggering change in the organizational context in which those
decisions are made. In short, it envisions an employer obligation to
avoid facilitating or enabling discriminatory bias in workplace
decisionmaking.
This focus on contextual change distinguishes a structural
approach from the individualized, motivational approach that
dominates existing antidiscrimination jurisprudence. Under an
individualized approach, disadvantage is located exclusively in the
esteem and their understanding of themselves and the world, this research suggests that
changing individuals' perception of their group identity to include a broad, overarching group
helps reduce subgroup tension. Id. at 190.
19. See, e.g., Don Operario & Susan T. Fiske, Racism Equals Power Plus Prejudice, in
CONFRONTING RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND RESPONSE 33, 49-52 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Susan
T. Fiske eds., 1998) (discussing the influence of power on stereotypic thinking and perceived
intergroup differences).
20. See, e.g., Diane Vaughan, Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of
Organizations, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 23 (1998) (describing the rise in attention to culture as a
contextual influence on decision making).
21. See, e.g., Madeline E. Heilman, Sex Stereotypes and Their Effects in the Workplace:
What We Know and What We Don't Know, 10 J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 12-13 (1995) (citing
studies on the effect of quality and clarity of information on stereotyping).
22. In earlier work, I used the term "discrimination in workplace dynamics" to describe this
form of discrimination. Although I still think this term more helpful (and less potentially
confusing) than the term "structural discrimination," the latter, as Professor Bagenstos's critique
suggests, seems to have gained momentum.
23. For several hypothetical examples illustrating the role that organizational structures
can play in enabling the subtle operation of discriminatory bias, see Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics, supra note 1, at 109-11. For examples of cases involving organizational
facilitation of bias, see Green, supra note 15, at 683-87.
20071
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
motivation of individual actors, either in the discriminatory
motivation of the discrete decisionmaker or in the choice of women
and people of color. 24 An individualized approach, accordingly, aims to
reduce discrimination in the workplace by prohibiting exclusionary
policies and by encouraging employers to create incentives that deter
individuals from consciously discriminating at crucial moments of
advancement, such as in promotions or hiring. Even unconscious bias
is seen under an individualized approach as a problem to be addressed
directly, by convincing people that they may be biased and by urging
them to control for their biases.
25
A structural approach to employment discrimination law, in
contrast, aims to reduce bias indirectly by triggering change in the
context of everyday decisions, perceptions, and judgments. This effort
finds empirical support in the research on the prevalence of implicit
bias and the influence of context, already discussed, and also in
research suggesting that unconscious bias may be more easily
controlled through contextual influence than through self-conscious
attempts not to discriminate. Results of the IAT and other studies that
demonstrate a disconnect between explicit and implicit attitudes
provide the first clue that it may be more difficult than we think to
control for our implicit biases. Even those of us who subscribe
wholeheartedly to an egalitarian ideal (and spend much of our
working lives trying to further that ideal) tend to register some bias
on the IAT. Moreover, although research supports the view that
implicit biases-and/or the translation of those biases into
behavior 26-can be lessened with self-conscious effort, that same
research suggests that self-conscious correction is difficult and
unlikely to produce substantial change on its own.
In the mid-1990s, social scientists Timothy Wilson and Nancy
Brekke undertook an extensive examination of the research on self-
24. See Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII:
Some Contemporary Influences, 92 MIcH. L. REV. 2370, 2372-78 (1994) (describing "motivational"
explanations of discrimination).
25. Cf. Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 10 (explaining that a structural approach aims to
"enhance decisionmakers' awareness, motivation, and control of [stereotypes and prejudices] and
thus mitigate the effects of implicit bias[,]" without mention of context).
26. The law, of course, is concerned primarily with the translation of biases into behavior.
Although it seems reasonable to expect that reduction in bias will result in reduction in biased
behavior, it is also possible that biased behavior might be reduced even without a reduction in
bias itself. See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and
Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1989) (reporting studies that
dissociate automatic processes from controlled processes); see also Christine Jolls & Cass R.
Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 200 (2006) (distinguishing between
efforts to "debias" society through law versus traditional efforts to insulate legal outcomes from
bias); Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 976-91 (same).
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correction for what they called "mental contamination," or biases that
are inconsistent with one's normative ideals. 27 Their review revealed
that correction for bias in cognitive processing like that involved in
discriminatory decisionmaking requires awareness, motivation, and
the ability not only to discern accurately the magnitude of biases but
also to correct for those biases, each of which is difficult. 28 Self-
correction of unconscious bias in the employment context is made even
more difficult by the variety of factors that go into employment
decisions. The discomfort most Americans feel about discriminating
makes it more likely that they will act on biases when there are other
plausible reasons for the decision.29 Because judgments about merit
and success in work are multi-faceted and frequently involve
perceptions about social skills as well as judgments about technical
ability, bias is likely to go uncorrected.
Recent research, moreover, suggests that extensive training
designed to reduce implicit biases may actually result in backlash, or
"reactance" and "correction," particularly in moments of deliberative
decisionmaking, like a hiring or promotion decision. According to
reactance theory, people will react against threats that limit their
personal sense of behavioral freedom.30 Correction theory takes this
idea one step further to posit that "people do not simply resist
attempts at control[;] . . they assess the direction and extent of
potential influence and then adjust and calibrate their responses to
compensate for this impact."31 In line with these theories, one recent
study showed that people who were subjected to extensive training in
gender bias against women and who were then asked to make an
employment decision about a leadership position tended to favor men
over women in that decision, just as people who were not subjected to
27. Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction:
Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117 (1994).
28. Id. at 119-20. Unlike error in human judgment that derives from failure to know or
apply a useful inferential rule, mental contamination cannot be corrected by consciously learning
a decision rule and deliberately applying it. Id. More recent research adds further support to the
view that self-correction of bias is difficult. See, e.g., John A. Bargh, The Cognitive Monster: The
Case Against the Controllability of Automatic Stereotype Effects, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 361 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999). For debate among legal
scholars on this issue, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup
Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1285-91 (1998); Michael Selmi,
Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L. J. 1233 (1999); Amy L. Wax,
Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L. J. 1129, 1158-69 (1999).
29. John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989
and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 315, 315 (2000).
30. See Kerry Kawakami et al., Kicking the Habit: Effects of Nonstereotypic Association




the training did. Only when the people subjected to the training were
asked to make an employment decision at the same time that they
performed another task (thus increasing their cognitive load) did they
not favor men over women. 32 This finding suggests that reducing bias
in decisionmaking directly through diversity training may be even
more complex than commentators have thus far realized.
33
This research should not be taken to mean that attempts to
instill self correction are misguided or inconsistent with a structural
approach. Change in contextual variables that increase self control
and awareness of the possibility of unconscious bias, such as
decisionmaking systems that require articulation of objective, non-
biased reasons and accountability mechanisms,34 even training,3 5 may
be an important avenue for minimizing discriminatory decisionmaking
in the workplace. However, self correction is neither the exclusive nor
the primary avenue utilized by a structural approach. Instead, a
structural approach seeks to minimize the operation of discriminatory
bias by altering the workplace context in which day-to-day perceptions
and judgments are made. In this way, a structural approach shares
common ground with recent efforts within the law and economics
school to account for bounded rationality through law.
36
By emphasizing the "intermediate level of analysis," a
structural approach also builds on a long line of work by structuralist
theorists, both inside and outside the legal academy. 37 In addition to
Rosabeth Moss Kanter and other sociologists whose research
emphasizes the role of context in shaping judgments, perceptions, and
expectations, 3 legal scholars, particularly in the area of sex and
32. Id.
33. For critique of the trend toward diversity training, and review of some of the research
on the effects of diversity training, see Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor
Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and
Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERK. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 38-44 (2001);
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 487, 514-15 (2003).
34. See Barbara F. Reskin & Debra Branch McBrier, Why Not Ascription? Organizations'
Employment of ,Male and Female Managers, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 210, 214 (2000); Reskin, supra
note 17, at 325.
35. See Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over
Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 42-49 (2003) (describing studies
on the impact of training on incidence of sexual harassment and concluding that the "studies
make training a worthwhile subject of study and probably a worthwhile pursuit for employers").
36. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 26.
37. ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION xiii (1977).
38. See, e.g., Robin J. Ely & David A. Thomas, Cultural Diversity at Work: The Effects of
Diversity Perspectives on Work Group Processes and Outcomes, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 229 (2001);
Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Other People: The Impact of Power on Stereotyping, 48 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 621 (1993); Reskin, supra note 17.
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gender, have argued that the environment in which decisions are
made plays a crucial role in perpetuating workplace subordination. In
her work on sexual harassment in the workplace, for example,
Professor Vicki Schultz has argued that "[i]nstead of encouraging
employers to deal with sex harassment by prohibiting sexual
interaction, the law should encourage them to attend to the larger
structures of gender inequality,"39 and Professor Theresa Beiner
recently proposed doctrinal changes to sexual harassment law that
would require factfinder consideration of structural factors, such as
whether the workplace is gender homogenous or is sexualized, in
determining whether a harassing environment is "because of sex."40
Professor Susan Sturm has argued more broadly for law as a tool to
effect structural change, 41 and Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu
Gulati have provided a "structural critique" of the workplace in the
area of race, using the literature on organizational behavior both to
unearth a "homogeneity incentive" for employers and to explore the
implications of that incentive for employees' performance of race and
racial identity.42
39. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2172 (2003).
40. THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO
REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAw 204, 205 (2005) ("Courts need to understand that
sexual harassment is not just the result of the presence of an individual bad actor but it is also
highly influenced by the working environment.") Although the primary emphasis in sexual
harassment law has been on the immediate impact of a hostile work environment' on women, see
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vincent, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (requiring that, to be actionable,
harassment must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive" so as to alter the terms & conditions of
employment and "create an abusive working environment") (internal quotations omitted), some
courts have recognized in passing the effect of a pervasively hostile work environment on the
operation of bias, see, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1503 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) ("The availability of photographs of nude and partially nude women .... may
encourage a significant proportion of the male population in the workforce to view.., women
coworkers as ... sex objects.") (citing expert witness testimony).
41. See Sturm, supra note 1.
42. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112
YALE L.J. 1757, 1788-89 (2003) (book review) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Law and
Economics]; see also id. at 1765 (suggesting that key concepts in critical race theory scholarship
fail to provide a "structural/institutional critique of the workplace"). Professors Carbado and
Gulati's work picks up on a key theme in structural theory: that structural conditions affect the
behavior of women and people of color as well as the males and whites who act on biases against
them. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000)
[hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity] (describing the extra "identity work" of women
and people of color); see also KANTER, supra note 37, at 262 (summarizing that "what appear to
be 'sex differences' in work behavior emerge as responses to structural conditions"); Vicki
Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in
the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749
(1990) (emphasizing the organization's role in shaping employee interest in nontraditional jobs).
For the same reason that disability activists have had little success relocating difference, efforts
to use law to address this problem are likely to be seen as crossing over into the realm of
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In my own work, I have also advocated a structural approach to
employment discrimination law. In Discrimination in Workplace
Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment
Theory, I examined the problem of "discrimination in workplace
dynamics" and identified its importance to the antidiscrimination
project. 43 Existing antidiscrimination law, I argued, is ill-equipped to
identify and address the more subtle forms of discrimination that
operate to limit opportunity on a day-to-day basis in the modern
workplace, largely because the legal doctrine is driven at one end by
an individualistic conception of discrimination and at the other end by
an institutional conception of discrimination, while often ignoring the
interplay between the two. 44 Elsewhere, I have examined the specific
problem of discriminatory work cultures and have argued for
regulatory reform aimed at changing the context in which those
cultures are formed.45
A structural approach to employment discrimination law
captures each of these more discrete scholarly endeavors by setting
the responsibility of the employer to avoid facilitating discriminatory
bias in workplace decisionmaking apart from the specifics of the
particular regulatory scheme. As such, a structural approach as I
define it differs in a critical respect from Professor Susan Sturm's
recent use of the term. Her pathbreaking work, particularly her article
Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, vividly illustrates the problem of structural discrimination
and provides the beginnings of a normative theory to justify
intervention. 46 The primary focus of that work, however, is on building
a system of bottom-up governance. 47 She argues that structural
accommodation mandate, and, accordingly, are likely to face greater political resistance. For
further discussion of this point, see infra Part III. C.
43. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 1.
44. Id. at 111-44. Scholars in the field of organizational behavior have termed this a "meso-
level" theorizing. See Robin Ely & Irene Padavic, A Feminist Analysis of Organizational Research
on Sex Differences, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. (forthcoming, 2007) (stating that "meso-level
theorizing... focuses on the interplay between organizational features and individual-level
processes").
45. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, supra note 1.
46. Sturm, supra note 1. For discussion of normative theory underlying structural
intervention, see id. at 473-74 (describing several possible normative foundations); Susan Sturm
& Lani Gunier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 953, 1031-34 (1996) (emphasizing work as a fundamental attribute of modern citizenship);
Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education,
29 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 247, 301-04 (2006) (developing the idea of "institutional citizenship").
47. Sturm, supra note 1, at 463 (explaining that the "motif of th[e] second generation
regulatory approach is that of structuralism," described as "an approach that encourages the
development of institutions and processes to enact general norms in particular contexts").
Professor Sturm's regulatory vision builds on the work of a number of scholars who argue for
[Vol. 60:3:849862
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discrimination is not well suited to the rule-based, after-the-fact
adjudicative nature of existing legal regulation and instead
necessitates a process of problem solving, one that she calls a
"structural approach" that "encourages organizations to gather and
share relevant information, builds individual and institutional
capacity to respond, and helps design and evaluate solutions that
involve employees who participate in the day-to-day patterns that
produce bias and exclusion."48 Although I agree with Professor Sturm
on the importance of opening our minds to new theories of governance,
for purposes of clarity, I submit that the particular governance scheme
that she advocates would be better termed, as it has been elsewhere, a
"problem-solving approach" or "new governance approach"49  to
distinguish it from the normative vision of employer obligation that it
seeks to advance.
50
Of much more importance as a normative matter, though, is
the prevailing misconception that a structural approach seeks to
impose costs on employers for society's wrongs. Professor Bagenstos,
in his recent critique, seems to agree that the term "structural
approach" better refers to a vision of employer obligation than to a
precise regulatory scheme, though he does not draw that distinction
expressly. However, Professor Bagenstos assumes that a "structural"
approach necessarily seeks to address society-wide rather than
bottom-up rather than top-down governance. For a description of some of the various approaches
in this area, see Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004).
48. Sturm, supra note 1, at 475.
49. See Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 277,
282-83 (using "problem-solving " process); Lobel, supra note 47, at 345-46 (listing the various
terms used to refer to nontraditional, bottom-up systems of governance and adopting the term
new governance model" to describe that paradigm of regulation).
50. Professor Sturm stresses that the problem-solving process inevitably shades into the
project of elaborating the applicable norms." Sturm, supra note 1, at 474. Although it is
undoubtedly true that the precise contours of the employer obligation will likely vary from
organization to organization, it is important to pursue an overarching normative vision of
employer obligation not to facilitate discriminatory decisionmaking in the workplace. Professor
Sturm's regulatory approach seems consistent with that position, see, e.g., id. at 555 ("Courts,
under this approach, are engaged in rearticulating the legitimacy and significance of the general
norm, and engaging the relevant actors in a dialogue to give that norm meaning in context."),
and her vision of employer obligation fits within a structural approach as I define it, see id. at
489 ('"This legal approach ... establishes a requirement that an employer take steps to minimize
the likelihood that its subjective decisionmaking processes will produce bias."). In a more recent
work, Professor Sturm advances a norm of institutional citizenship under which employers
would be obligated to address barriers to full institutional participation. See Sturm, supra note
46, at 250 ("[A]Ill institutional citizens should be able to realize their potential and participate
fully in the life of the institution.").
2007] 863
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:3:849
employer-specific barriers to equality in employment. 51 This is not
surprising, given his earlier work in the disability context, 52 but it is
deeply problematic. And Professor Bagenstos is not alone. Scholars
across disciplines tend to use the term "structural" to refer broadly to
any institutional barrier, employer-created or otherwise, to
occupational and/or social equality.53 Although this broad use of the
term makes sense descriptively-to redress the inequality identified
will require a change in institutional structures-it leads too easily to
the assumption that all efforts to effect change in workplace
structures are rooted normatively in the social inequality that results
from the interplay between societal wrongs and neutral workplace
structures.
54
51. See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 40 (arguing that with a structural approach "we may be
asking antidiscrimination law to do too much of the work of responding to society's inequalities").
52. In The Future of Disability Law, Professor Bagenstos argued that the ADA's limited
effect on the overall employment of people with disabilities stems primarily from "the inability of
antidiscrimination laws to eliminate the deep structural barriers to employment that people with
disabilities face." Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2004).
Those "structural" barriers, according to Bagenstos, are "societal structures" such as lack of
outside-of-work personal-assistance services, accessible transportation, and health care. Id. at
23.
53. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of
Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 136
(1989) ("[T]hose aspects of the workplace which cause work-family conflict are largely structural
features that have resulted from the adoption of facially neutral policies, or from the inaction
and inadequacies of the structures which generate conflict between work-family roles."); Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Foreward-Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and
Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3-6 & n.14 (2000)
(describing the ADA and disparate impact theory as representing "a "structural model" to
equality"); Michael A. Rebell, Structural Discrimination and the Rights of the Disabled, 74 GEO.
L.J. 1435, 1452 (1986) ("[T]he critical analytical problem of discrimination in the handicapped
context now is less one of overcoming bigotry and invidious prejudice than one of redesigning
social structures and institutions to make them more responsive to the needs of the disabled
segment of the population. It is, in short, a problem of structural change.").
54. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 476, 515 (2000) (describing the "structural equality project" of the ADA as one
that seeks to remove "structural barriers" and noting that such a project has "significant
redistributive implications"); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict
and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1376 n.140
(2006) ("The [women's] strike demands represent equality as question of social structure.... For
the structural/institutional model, inequality is a question of distributive justice that rectifying
the social relations producing caregiver dependency can ameliorate."); Suk, supra note 2, at 418
(using the term "cumulative outsider disadvantage" to refer to disadvantage resulting from
biased behavior in day-to-day workplace interactions and stating that "what is troubling about
cumulative outsider disadvantage is the resulting harm of inequality, not the moral character of
the behaviors themselves" that lead to that inequality).
Use of the term "institutional" discrimination seems to have fared no better. See, e.g.,
Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 1-3 (describing institutional racism as a problem of neutral practices
with harmful effects); cf. Ian F. Haney L6pez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New
864
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In the next Part, I identify the significance of this assumption
for a structural approach to employment discrimination law.
Bagenstos and others who assume that a structural approach is
concerned exclusively with societal effect, I argue, vastly
underestimate the strength of the normative foundation for a
structural approach. In Part III, I explain why the assumption is
mistaken.
II. RECLAIMING THE NORMATIVE CORE OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW
Few would dispute that animus-based discrimination is
inherently wrongful. The employer that purposefully excludes
members of certain groups based on its view that members of that
group are of less moral worth has committed a wrong that deserves
correction and punishment.55 But employment discrimination law has
not been limited to irrational, animus-based exclusion; instead, it
extends to rational reliance on customer preferences and statistical
generalizations, 56 use of job requirements that serve as occupational
barriers to historically subordinated groups, 57 and failure to provide
reasonable accommodations to employees or applicants with known
disabilities. 58  The tension between the paradigmatic view of
Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1727-28 (2000) (emphasizing the role that
individual bias, albeit unintentional, plays in institutional discrimination).
Indeed, it may be most useful to rework the terminology to capture the forms of
discrimination that can result from employers' structures and practices. We might, for example,
distinguish "structural discrimination," defined here as the use of structures or institutional
practices that facilitate discriminatory bias in workplace decisionmaking, see also Green,
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 1 (using the term "discrimination in
workplace dynamics"), from "construct discrimination," defined as the use of structures or
institutional practices that do not facilitate discriminatory bias in workplace decisionmaking but
that do nonetheless contribute to broader social inequality.
55. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences,
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 175 (1992) (describing animus-based
discrimination as an "intrinsically immoral" act). This, of course, assumes that the employer is
an individual or an organization capable of moral wrong. See infra notes 146-47 and
accompanying text.
56. See City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978)
(stating that, even if discrimination is "based on a sound and well-recognized business practice,
it would nevertheless be discriminatory, and the defendant would be forced to assert an
affirmative defense").
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2000) (prohibiting employment practices that result in
disparate impact); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2000) (prohibiting selection criteria that screen out
people with disabilities unless the criteria are job related and consistent with business
necessity); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that intelligence tests that
have a disparate impact on minorities but do not bear on job performance violate Title VII).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
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discrimination as the animus-driven employer and the reality that
employment discrimination law seeks to address much more than
animus-based exclusion has led to an emerging view that all (or
almost all) of antidiscrimination law is inherently and exclusively
distributive. In this Part, I pull back on that view. I argue that the
existence of an employer wrong, animus-based or otherwise, that is
independent of the wrong of contributing to social inequality
distinguishes antidiscrimination from accommodation mandates. 59
A. A Meaningful Normative Divide: Costs and Employer Wrong
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), with its express
requirement in Title I that employers provide reasonable
accommodation to individuals with disabilities, renewed a
longstanding debate about the distinction between antidiscrimination
and accommodation mandates.60 This debate has resulted in a recent
scholarly move toward viewing all antidiscrimination law as wholly
distributive, as nothing more than a policy decision to impose taxes on
certain groups and to provide subsidies to others. In the employment
context, the argument is that employment discrimination laws should
be viewed as imposing a tax on employers for broader social goals (a
tax that might be better imposed on governmental or other entities),
and that protected groups should be viewed as receiving a subsidy for
those broader social goals. Because this line of scholarship grows out
of early efforts to distinguish antidiscrimination and accommodation
59. The terminology here is admittedly confusing, but it is sufficiently entrenched that I
hesitate to create new terms. For clarification: the term "antidiscrimination law" is used here to
refer to the umbrella of regulation of employer conduct regarding forbidden classifications.
Antidiscrimination law, as I understand it, can include antidiscrimination mandates as well as
accommodation mandates and, of course, a variety of regulatory schemes, legal rights-based or
otherwise. The terms "antidiscrimination mandate" and "accommodation mandate," in contrast,
refer to broad categories of regulation within antidiscrimination law, distinguished on the basis
of normative underpinning. Within those categories sit specific regulatory schemes, such as an
accommodation requirement or a prohibition on intentional, animus-based different treatment.
These specific regulatory schemes can in some circumstances impose an accommodation mandate
and in others circumstances an antidiscrimination mandate, depending upon whether the costs
imposed by the mandate are tied to employer wrong in the workplace. In diagram form, the
terminology looks like this:
Antidiscrimination Law (employment)
Normative foundation: Antidiscrimination Mandate-Accommodation Mandate
Regulatory scheme: accommodation requirement-prohibition on animus-based exclusion-
disparate impact- problem solving
60. Feminist scholars have long argued that antidiscrimination law must include an
obligation to accommodate when it comes to pregnancy. E.g., Herma Hill Kay, Equality and
Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 26-28 (1985).
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mandates and subsequent critique of those efforts, it helps to start
with a brief review of that debate.
In the decade after the ADA's passage, commentators
overwhelmingly maintained that the obligation to provide reasonable
accommodation under Title I of the ADA was fundamentally distinct
from the obligation not to discriminate under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. 6' Implicit in their arguments was a sense that employers
that refuse to provide disability-related accommodations are not
discriminating per se but rather are responding rationally to the
added cost of those accommodations. 62 According to these scholars, the
ADA's obligation to accommodate, unlike Title VII's obligation not to
discriminate, requires that employers go beyond what "even a
perfectly competitive market would afford."63 Professor Mark Kelman
has provided one of the more extensive arguments along these lines.
In his article, Market Discrimination, he argues that capitalist
rationality distinguishes "simple discrimination" from requests for
accommodation. 64 For Kelman, refusals to accommodate stand apart
from acts of simple discrimination because they are based on
61. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 41 (1996) (stating that the ADA's reasonable
accommodation requirement sets the ADA "profound[ly" apart from Title VII); Linda Hamilton
Krieger, supra note 53, at 3 ("The ADA incorporated a profoundly different model of equality
from that associated with traditional non-discrimination statutes like Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.").
62. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective: Three
Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2583, 2585-86 (1994) (describing the reasonable
accommodation requirement of the ADA as a "constructed equality" regime that involves "an
effort to go beyond the protections that even a perfectly competitive market would afford");
Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment
Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 315-
16 (2000) (arguing that the ADA "marks a... departure" from Title VII, even its disparate
impact branch, because "the claim.., is not that employers are enslaved to irrational
preconceptions, but that even if the preconceptions reflect actual productivity, there is an
independent duty to accommodate a disabled candidate"); Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination
and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 834 (2000) (arguing that capitalist rationality distinguishes
"simple discrimination" from accommodation); Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn,
Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1204 (2003)
(arguing that the ADA "extends beyond the Title VII models" because it "requires employers to
accommodate individuals with disabilities even though they cost more to employ than others or
are able to produce less"); see also Stein, supra note 4, at 616 (describing scholars of the
"canonical" framework as believing "that as a by-product of capitalistic rationality, excluding
disabled employees on economic efficiency grounds does not raise the same ethical issues of
wrongdoing as does irrational omission of other workers").
63. Donohue, supra note 62, at 2586.
64. See Kelman, supra note 62, at 892 ("Broadly speaking, the plaintiff seeking to block
simple discrimination asks to be treated no worse than others who are equivalent sources of
money.... [T]he plaintiff seeking an accommodation wants the seller or employer to ignore the
input costs associated with generating a certain level of gross receipts or gross outputs ....").
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impersonal, capitalist calculations about the costs involved. 65 And,
because those costs are just one part of a bigger social fisc,
accommodation claims, according to Kelman, require distributive
justifications that simple discrimination claims do not. As Kelman
explains, "Accommodation claims are best conceived of as zero-sum,
distributive claims to a finite pot of redistributed social resources,
competing not only with the demands of others who seek
accommodation (or the wishes of putative defendants) but with all
claimants on state resources."
66
At about the same time that Kelman and others stressed the
difference between traditional antidiscrimination law under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act and the accommodation requirement of the
ADA, scholars began to revisit earlier assumptions about the costs
imposed by traditional antidiscrimination laws. In her influential
article, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, Professor Christine
Jolls called into question the cost-based distinction between the ADA's
accommodation requirement and Title VII's prohibition on
discrimination. 67  Specifically, she pointed out that in some
circumstances the disparate impact theory of Title VII "requires
employers to incur special costs in response to the distinctive needs
(as measured against existing market structures) of particular,
identifiable demographic groups of employees," just as the ADA
accommodation requirement does.68 To use her example, a disparate
impact challenge to an employer's no-beard policy for pizza deliverers,
based on the fact that twenty percent of customers would "react
negatively to a delivery man wearing a beard," imposes an economic
cost in the form of lost business or lower prices. 69 Similarly,
prohibitions on employer discrimination in response to discriminatory
65. See id. at 841 ("A person suffers from simple discrimination insofar as an employer...
fails to treat him 'impersonally'... [or] insofar as he treats the plaintiff employee or job
applicant worse than he treats statistically typical employees or applicants whose net marginal
product is no higher."); id. at 836 n.8 ("It is linguistically awkward to think of the defendant in a
simple discrimination suit as "expending" any "resources" when he ceases discriminating against
the plaintiff, while it is perfectly comprehensible to speak of the accommodating defendant as
expending resources to meeting the plaintiffs demands.").
66. Kelman includes disparate impact theory within his simple discrimination category,
leaving only the ADA accommodation requirement in the distributive camp. See id. at 891 n.86.
67. Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001).
68. Id. at 648 (defining accommodation as a "legal rule that requires employers to incur
special costs in response to the distinctive needs (as measured against existing market
structures) of particular, identifiable demographic groups of employees, such as individuals with
(observable) disabilities, and imposes this requirement in circumstances in which the employer
has no intention of treating the group in question differently on the basis of group membership
(or 'discriminating against' the group in the canonical sense)").




preferences of customers or coworkers, as well as prohibitions on
employer reliance on statistical generalizations, impose real financial
costs on employers, just as requirements of accommodation do.
70
Professor Bagenstos soon picked up where Professor Jolls left
off by challenging the normative vision underlying commentators'
distinction between antidiscrimination and accommodation: "that the
nonaccommodating employer's pursuit of the proper goal of profit
maximization makes him less worthy of moral condemnation, and
consequently less appropriately subject to stringent regulation, than
the discriminating employer." 71 Antidiscrimination laws have always
prohibited rational conduct by employers, argued Bagenstos; indeed,
he made a persuasive case that antidiscrimination and
accommodation mandates cannot be distinguished on the basis of the
costs that they impose. Professor Bagenstos also argued, in this and
his earlier work, that traditional antidiscrimination laws and the ADA
share a common goal of antisubordination, or social equality. In some
respects, this argument mirrored one being made in the traditional
civil rights context as scholars struggled to understand the norm of
colorblindness and its relationship to the antidiscrimination project,
and it holds particular appeal with disability rights scholars who have
argued that the ADA's accommodation requirement fits within larger
equality ideals.72 But while most scholars, including Jolls, drew on the
similarities between traditional antidiscrimination laws and the ADA
to argue for the ADA's legitimacy as an antidiscrimination law,
Professor Bagenstos used it to question the normative foundation of
all antidiscrimination law. According to Bagenstos, the fact that
antidiscrimination and accommodation mandates cannot be
distinguished on the basis of the costs imposed, together with the fact
that all antidiscrimination laws share a common goal of social
equality, 73 means that there is no fundamental normative difference
between antidiscrimination and accommodation mandates, and that
antidiscrimination and accommodation mandates alike "must be
70. Id. at 686-87; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86
VA. L. REv. 397, 456-57, 457 n.223 (2000) (discussing the costs imposed by prohibition of forms of
"rational" discrimination).
71. Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 830.
72. See, e.g., Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the
Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERs L.J. 861 (2004).
73. Professor Bagenstos makes this argument in Rational Discrimination and in an earlier
article, Subordination, Stigma & "Disability." See Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 839 (arguing that
antidiscrimination requirement of Title VII and accommodation requirement of ADA share
common goal of "dismantl[ing] patterns of group-based social subordination"); Bagenstos, supra
note 70, at 452-61 (arguing for an antisubordination approach to all civil rights laws).
2007] 869
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:3:849
justified in a manner that takes full account of the incidence and
distributive effects of their implicit taxes and subsidies. '74
Professor Richard Ford presents a variation on this theme in
his recent book, Racial Culture.75 Professor Ford spends much of the
book developing a trenchant examination of the dangers posed by
arguments for a legal right to be free from employer demands to
assimilate. In the last chapter, however, he proposes a Coasian, joint-
costs approach to the analysis of antidiscrimination law, including
employment discrimination laws, under which the costs of regulation
are weighed against the costs of nonregulation to determine whether
to regulate.7 6 According to Ford, this Coasian approach pushes us to
consider the nature of the imposed costs-whether "hard" or "soft"-
and to see employees as well as employers as actors who can change
their behavior to alleviate those costs. 77 Moreover, argues Ford, a joint
costs analysis facilitates consideration of the cost imposed by legal
rights on other employees within the group being protected and,
accordingly, on the group as a whole. 78
On some level, Professors Bagenstos and Ford must be right. If
the end goal of antidiscrimination law as a whole is to increase social
equality for groups that have been historically subjected to stigma and
subordination, then one must consider the possibility that particular
74. Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 921. This is the danger of advocating an antisubordination
theory of discrimination without attention to the normative implications of that move. See, e.g.,
Brake, supra note 4, at 21 (arguing that "[t]heorizing retaliation as a form of discrimination" is
useful because it "requires moving beyond discrimination law's current dominant framework of
status-based differential treatment and toward a broader conception that views discrimination
as the maintenance of race and gender privilege").
75. FORD, supra note 7, at 171.
76. See id. at 169-209. Professor Ford begins the chapter with a quote from Mark Kelman &
Gillian Lester's book, Jumping the Queue, suggesting that Ford believes that right-to-difference
proponents are "claim-hopping on the (ideological) backs of instances of genuine victimization."
Id. at 169 (quoting MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO
THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES 226 (1997)). But Professor
Ford's reliance on Kelman and Lester's work here is puzzling, for he does not seem to think that
right-to-difference proposals serve as tax-and-spend mechanisms in the way that Kelman and
Lester think that the ADA's accommodation mandate does. Instead, his argument is that a joint-
costs analysis weighs against recognizing a legal right to difference in employment
discrimination law.
77. See id. at 174 ("By looking at the problem as one of joint costs, we can see that both
parties are potentially empowered to affect the outcome."). In considering the costs imposed on
individuals for changing their "mutable" behaviors and traits, Professor Ford focuses exclusively
on what he calls the "soft" costs associated with identity. See id. at 174-75 (contrasting "hard," or
objective, costs with "soft," or subjective and nonmonetary, costs). But see Green, Work Culture,
supra note 1, at 650-53 (examining both the objective and subjective harms associated with
employer demands to assimilate along a white, male norm).
78. See FORD, supra note 7, at 177 ("Rights-to-difference will function to regulate members
of the group they purport to protect, effectively requiring them to bear some of the costs of rights
assertion whether they like it or not.").
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antidiscrimination requirements, and the costs imposed by those
requirements, fail to translate into greater social equality. This is why
empirical work on the effect of employment discrimination laws on the
employment of women, racial minorities, and individuals with
disabilities is so important 79 It shows us whether the methods that we
have adopted serve to further or undermine the broader goal.
But Professor Bagenstos is wrong to suggest that there is no
fundamental normative difference between antidiscrimination and
accommodation mandates in a particular context, like employment.80
There is no question that antidiscrimination laws, including those
regulating employment discrimination, aim to achieve social equality.
As a number of scholars have shown, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
understand antidiscrimination laws without reference to broader
social goals.81 But employment discrimination laws achieve the end of
social equality, for the most part, by imposing burdens on employers
for their own wrongful treatment of individuals in the workplace; in
other words, by imposing antidiscrimination mandates. Only when
employment discrimination laws seek to achieve social equality by
imposing costs on employers that cannot be tied to employer wrong in
the workplace do the laws stand or fall on the strength of their
distributive claims.8 2 Scholars who miss this distinction cast aside the
fault-based component of much of antidiscrimination law.
79. See, e.g., THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A POLICY PUZZLE
(David C. Stapleton & Richard V. Burkhauser eds., 2003) (exploring various explanations for the
decline in employment among the working-aged disabled population); Christine Jolls, Identifying
the Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act Using State-law Variation: Preliminary
Evidence on Educational Participation Effects, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 447 (2004) (providing evidence
that the ADA caused a greater increase in educational opportunities for disabled individuals in
states where the statute was a substantial innovation).
80. Bagenstos's failure to see the normative distinction leads him to his assumption that a
structural approach aims to impose costs for society's wrongs. See infra Part III. He makes a
similar claim in the ADA context. See Bagenstos, supra note 52 (arguing that the employment
title of the ADA aimed to increase employment of individuals with disabilities by imposing costs
associated with larger societal barriers on employers).
81. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (arguing that
"antisubordination values have shaped the historical development of anticlassification
understandings"); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values
in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1477 (2004) (arguing that
"antisubordination values live at the root of the anticlassification principle"); see also Robert
Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1,
17 (2000) (arguing that antidiscrimination law should be understood "as a social practice, which
regulates other social practices").
82. I agree with those scholars who argue that regulated conduct in this area falls on a
continuum, e.g., J.H. Verkerke, Disaggregating Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 44 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1385, 1401-02 (2003), but the distinction between antidiscrimination and
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In much the same way, a Coasian "joint-cost" analysis like that
proposed by Professor Ford, although helpful for its ability to bring
costs into focus, risks casting an employer's act of discrimination as
nothing more than a violation of rules of efficiency. Antidiscrimination
law under this account does not correct for, punish, or deter wrongs; it
distributes costs. Of course, it is possible to bring justice concerns back
in, as Professor Ford's analysis reflects,8 3 but a Coasian approach
nonetheless suggests that the policy decision whether to impose costs
on employers can be made without considering whether the costs
imposed are tied to specific employers' wrongs in the workplace, or
whether they instead must be justified more broadly, independent of
those wrongs, as a means of furthering social justice.
In A Structural Turn, in fact, Professor Bagenstos describes the
political resistance to employment discrimination laws that impose
costs absent employer wrong, without recognizing that that political
resistance maps onto a meaningful normative divide between
antidiscrimination and accommodation mandates.8 4 According to
Professor Bagenstos, the limits of antidiscrimination law are defined
by one of two competing purposes: social equality (sometimes called a
theory of "antisubordination") or punishment and correction for moral
wrongs (commonly understood as a theory of "antidiscrimination").8 5 I
submit that these two purposes are concurrent and overlapping rather
than competing, at least for antidiscrimination mandates.8 6 In other
words, even if we were to achieve broader social equality, we would be
likely to retain antidiscrimination mandates, both to compensate for
harm to individuals and to deter employers from engaging in wrongful
acts that have the potential of returning us to the segregation and
subordination of the nation's past. We would be less likely, however, to
accommodation mandates is nonetheless important, both normatively and politically. See infra
Part III.
83. See FORD, supra note 7, at 176 (arguing that all antidiscrimination law allocates social
costs, but recognizing that "it is appropriate to require potential discriminators to bear these
costs").
84. Professor Bagenstos does use the word "normative" to describe the divide, Bagenstos,
supra note 2, at 4, but, given his other work, I suspect that he would not consider the divide a
"meaningful" one. Instead, he sees the normative foundation of all antidiscrimination law as one
of moral obligation not to contribute to social and economic subordination in society. See
Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 837-38.
85. Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 40-41.
86. To put this view in terms of longstanding debate, the antidiscrimination principle holds
particular normative weight, but our conception of equality need not be limited to that principle.
See, e.g., Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1976) (arguing in favor of an anticlassification principle); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976) (arguing in favor of an antisubordination
principle).
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retain accommodation mandates, for those mandates are imposed
exclusively to achieve social equality.
8 7
The immediate challenge-both normative and political-for a
structural approach to employment discrimination law, then, lies not
in accounting for imposition of costs or justifying employer-based
subsidies, but in locating employer wrong. Existing antidiscrimination
doctrine largely fits this account, and where it does not, without some
alternative justification for maintaining the imposition of cost, courts
are likely to balk (or to reframe it so that it does).88 In the next
Section, I trace existing antidiscrimination doctrine under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act and Title I of the ADA to map the divide I have
outlined between antidiscrimination and accommodation mandates.
This examination, drawing extensively on Professor Jolls's cost-based
insights, reveals two circumstances in which existing employment
discrimination law imposes an accommodation mandate, and uncovers
advocates' efforts to justify imposing costs in those circumstances.
B. Locating Employer Wrong in Existing Employment
Discrimination Law
Existing employment discrimination law largely mirrors the
normative divide that I have identified between antidiscrimination
and accommodation mandates. When the law imposes costs absent
87. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 106 (1972) ("We will revert back
toward evil-motive and equal-treatment concepts of discrimination when the social system
operates in a fairer way."). If we were to achieve social equality and to maintain it for some
number of years, it is possible that we would no longer impose antidiscrimination mandates Oust
as we do not prohibit discrimination based on hair color or shoe size).
This view roughly parallels the philosophical concepts of corrective and distributive justice,
with corrective justice focusing on wrongs done to others and distributive justice on a just and
equitable distribution of wealth and power. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 115-23 (Martin
Ostwald trans., 1962); Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to
Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515, 515-16 (1992) (questioning whether corrective and
distributive justice are wholly unrelated and, if so, whether the two concepts are reconcilable).
The concept of corrective justice has been used to refer broadly to efforts to correct present
effects of past wrongs as well as to efforts to correct for society's wrongs. E.g., Paul Gewirtz,
Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728,
731-32 (1986). I use the term "corrective" here to refer to laws that are aimed at redressing (and
prohibiting) an employer's wrong committed against individuals in the workplace. By arguing
that antidiscrimination mandates obtain normative strength from their corrective focus,
however, I do not mean to suggest that distributive concerns are not implicated. For a recent
argument that distributive ideals should inform calculation of damage awards in the tort
context, see Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the
Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1435 (2005).
88. Professor Bagenstos recognizes this much in A Structural Turn, but nonetheless
misunderstands the goals of a structural approach. See infra Part III.
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employer wrong in the workplace, it faces greater political resistance
and requires a distributive justification for imposing the costs on
employers rather than on governmental or other entities. Existing
employment discrimination laws impose accommodation mandates in
two circumstances, one involving disparate impact liability and the
other involving liability for failure to accommodate a disability or
other protected characteristic or behavior.
1. Disparate Treatment Liability
Disparate treatment theory imposes liability on an employer
when that employer is shown to have intentionally disfavored
individuals based on their membership in a protected group.8 9 In
addition to holding employers liable for express policies, disparate
treatment theory holds employers liable for pervasive patterns or
practices of segregation and subordination that give rise to an
inference of intent.90 With its focus on intent, disparate treatment
theory has long been understood to present the paradigmatic picture
of discrimination as the product of animus against or conscious
reliance on irrational stereotypes concerning members of particular
groups. Costs imposed by disparate treatment liability are justified by
the employer's commitment of, as Professor Larry Alexander puts it,
an "intrinsically morally wrong" act.9' Disparate treatment law
therefore imposes an antidiscrimination mandate. The employer who
purposefully excludes members of certain groups based on its view
that members of that group are of less moral worth has committed a
wrong that deserves correction and punishment.
The definition of "intent," of course, is the subject of substantial
debate, and my aim in this Article is not to redefine the meaning of
intent in disparate treatment theory doctrine. It is enough, for now at
least, to recognize that intentional discrimination as traditionally
understood has not been limited to animus-based exclusion, and that,
even when the cases involve individual rather than systemic disparate
89. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000) ("The ultimate
question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is
whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination.").
90. In "pattern or practice" cases, significant disparities between the makeup of the
employer's workforce and the makeup of the pool from which the employer draws its employees
is evidence of intentional discrimination because, absent explanation, "it is ordinarily to be
expected that nondiscriminatory hiring [and promotion] practices will in time result in a work
force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the populating in the
community from which the employees are [drawn]." Int'l Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977).
91. Alexander, supra note 55, at 158-59 (describing an "intrinsically wrong" act of
discrimination as one that judges others incorrectly "to be of less moral worth").
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treatment and the employer's liability is vicarious rather than direct,
the moral wrong of the employer has gone largely unquestioned. 92
2. Disparate Impact Liability
Rather than expressly searching for intent, disparate impact
theory imposes liability on an employer when it is shown that the
employer uses an employment practice that has a disparate impact on
a group with protected characteristics and when the employer cannot
show that the use of that practice is job related and consistent with
business necessity. 93 In some circumstances, disparate impact theory
imposes an antidiscrimination mandate; in others, it imposes an
accommodation mandate.
When disparate impact theory roots out employer intent to
discriminate, it imposes an antidiscrimination mandate. 94 Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., the first Supreme Court case to recognize disparate
impact theory as a theory of discrimination under Title VII, provides a
good example. 95 Although the district court in the case found no intent
to discriminate, and the Supreme Court did not question that finding,
the facts of Griggs suggest otherwise. 96 The case involved a claim by a
black plaintiff against an employer with a history of blatantly
exclusionary practices under which black employees were restricted to
the Labor Department, one of five departments at the power station
92. One notable exception is in the Fourth Circuit. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockheed Martin
Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277, 291 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that an employer cannot be held
liable for the biased action of a subordinate to the ultimate decisionmaker, even if that
subordinate's bias played a "significant" role in the employment decision); cf. EEOC v. BCI Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that an employer can be
held liable for the biased action of a subordinate to the ultimate decisionmaker if the employee
shows that the subordinate's biased action "caused" the employment decision), cert. granted, 127
S. Ct. 852 (2007), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 931 (2007) (upon settlement).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1991). Although historically associated with race- and sex-
discrimination under Title VII, and now expressly incorporated into that statute, supra,
disparate impact liability is available in other contexts. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S.
228 (2005) (holding that disparate impact claims can be brought under the ADEA); Raytheon Co.
v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 51 (2003) (holding that disparate impact claims can be brought under
the ADA). For an argument that disparate impact theory should be used more widely in the
disability context, see Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate
Impact, and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861 (2006).
94. The employer is blameworthy in this scenario because it intends to exclude members of
certain groups, judging members of that group to be of less moral worth. See Alexander, supra
note 55. The reverse, however, is not always true. Lack of intent, in other words, does not
necessarily lead to lack of blameworthiness. See infra Part IIIB.
95. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
96. The Court relied on Duke Power's willingness to pay some of the education costs for
those who sought to finish high school as evidence of nonintent. Id. at 432.
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run by Duke Power Co. 97 Following the passage of the Civil Rights
Act-indeed, on the same date that Title VII was to become effective-
Duke Power replaced its express exclusionary practices with two
facially neutral job requirements for non-Labor jobs: a high school
diploma and a satisfactory score on two standardized aptitude tests.98
Workers in the previously all-white departments who did not have
high school diplomas continued to work in those departments and to
achieve promotions. 99  The timing and nature of the new job
requirements, together with the lack of legitimate business reason for
their adoption, lead one to suspect that Duke Power turned to
requirements that were generally known to have a significant racial
impact as a way of maintaining its segregated workforce.10 0 Disparate
impact liability in these circumstances imposes an antidiscrimination
mandate, for costs imposed are tied to the employer's moral wrong of
intending to exclude members of a certain race.101
Although Griggs and many other early cases can be read to
support this rooting-out rationale for disparate impact liability, the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, as Professor Jolls points out, gives disparate
impact liability a much broader scope.10 2 A brief background on the
case law leading up to the 1991 Act illustrates this point.
In the late 1980s, when the Supreme Court held that disparate
impact theory could be applied to subjective decisionmaking practices
as well as to objective job requirements like those at issue in Griggs
97. Id. at 426-27.
98. Id. at 427-28. Prior to the Act's passage, Duke Power required a high school diploma for
all non-labor positions, but Black employees with high school diplomas were still employed only
in the labor department. Blumrosen, supra note 87, at 64. After the Act's passage, Duke Power
extended the high school diploma requirement to all positions. Id. at 65. For initial employment
in the previously all-white departments, Duke Power required a high school diploma and
passage of two aptitude tests. Id. For transfer between departments, Duke Power required a
high school diploma or passage of the two tests. Id. Similarly, many of the early disparate impact
cases involved seniority and transfer systems that locked in the effects of past blatant
discriminatory practices. E.g., Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980, 983 (5th Cir. 1969).
99. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427.
100. For a detailed discussion of the factual and procedural history of the Griggs case, and an
account of its importance in a litigation campaign aimed at defining discrimination beyond
subjective intent, see Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and
Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431
(2005).
101. See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1299-1311 (1987) (arguing, before congressional
amendment of Title VII in 1991, that the smoking-out rationale is the only defensible basis for
disparate impact theory). Some might argue that it is problematic to use disparate impact theory
in this way, because it requires a lesser showing of intent, but if it captures those cases in which
the employer did intend to exclude, it nonetheless serves as an antidiscrimination mandate.
102. Jolls, supra note 67, at 665-66.
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and other earlier cases, Justice O'Connor, in a plurality opinion,
argued that employers need only offer "legitimate business reasons"
for the challenged practice in order to avoid liability. 10 3 The following
year, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, Justice O'Connor attained
a majority for her position, and the Court held that the "dispositive
issue" for purposes of determining business necessity was "whether a
challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate
employment goals of the employer."1 04 Although a "mere insubstantial
justification will not suffice, because such a low standard of review
would permit discrimination to be practiced through the use of
spurious, seemingly neutral employment practices," the challenged
practice, according to the Court, need not be " 'essential' or
'indispensable' to the employer's business for it to pass muster."10
5
Congress responded to Wards Cove in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.106
There, it adopted the language "business necessity" and supplied an
interpretive memorandum accompanying the relevant portion of the
act, which states that "business necessity" is "intended to reflect the
concepts enunciated in the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., and in other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio."
10 7
As Professor Jolls illustrates, when disparate impact theory
imposes liability in cases in which the employer lacks a legitimate
business reason for adopting the requirement, it is reasonable to infer
that the employer acted intentionally, and disparate impact theory
imposes an antidiscrimination requirement.108 When disparate impact
theory imposes liability in cases in which the employer had a
legitimate business reason for adopting the requirement but could not
meet the business necessity standard, in contrast, it imposes an
accommodation mandate. 0 9
103. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988).
104. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
105. Id.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1991).
107. 137 CONG. REC. 28,2680 (1991). The memorandum also provides that the interpretive
memorandum is the only source of legislative history that may be "relied upon in any way" in
interpreting the business necessity requirement. Id.
108. Jolls, supra note 67, at 647.
109. I put to the side for a moment the use of disparate impact theory to challenge subjective
decisionmaking practices, which I argue presents a problem of structural discrimination. See
infra Part III. For an exploration of the various possible motives of disparate impact law, see




Although Jolls does not put it this way, 110 the law in this latter
circumstance requires the employer to bear a cost that is not tied to its
own wrongdoing. A simple variation on Griggs provides a basic
example. In the real case, the Court held that the employer had
provided no empirically supported business justification for its use of a
high school diploma requirement (and, as discussed above, although
the Court does not expressly rely on it, there was evidence that might
have supported an inference of intent on the part of the employer in
that case).11 If, however, the employer had provided a business
justification showing some correlation between attainment of a high
school diploma and success in the jobs in question, although not one
sufficient to meet the business necessity requirement, then to hold the
employer liable would impose a cost on the employer tied not to the
employer's wrongdoing but to society's longtime segregation and
subordination of African Americans in high school education.
112
Indeed, much of the rhetoric in Griggs suggests the Supreme
Court's intention to impose an accommodation mandate as a way of
breaking down barriers to employment, regardless of any wrongdoing
on the part of the employer. According to the Court, "Congress has
now required that the posture and condition of the job-seeker be taken
into account." 113 And, consistent with this view, most commentators
characterize disparate impact theory as a unique civil rights vision
that furthers a "[g]roup interest in seeing that its members are not
harmed in employment because of discrimination elsewhere in
society."' 1
4
In practice, of course, the line between disparate impact
liability as antidiscrimination mandate and disparate impact liability
110. Jolls limits her project to identifying cost similarities between the prohibition on
discrimination in Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause and the accommodation requirement
of the ADA, except for brief mention of non-cost-based similarities. Jolls, supra note 67, at 695-
97.
111. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427, 431-32 (1971).
112. See generally JOE R. FEAGIN & CLAIRECE BOOHER FEAGIN, DISCRIMINATION AMERICAN
STYLE: INSTITUTIONAL RACISM AND SEXISM 55-61 (1986) (describing the social forces that render
"screening" mechanisms, like the high school diploma requirement in Griggs, barriers to
employment for certain groups). The wrong of the employer in this circumstance can only be
framed in terms of broader social inequality: the use of job requirements that perpetuate
workplace segregation, social stigma, and subordination of Blacks. See infra Part III.
113. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
114. E.g., Belton, supra note 100, at 471-72 (describing Griggs as part of a litigation strategy
to broaden the meaning of discrimination and to "reshape the contours of the debate about
equality"); Blumrosen, supra note 87, at 67; id. at 69-71 (describing the development of a
definition of discrimination that would "relate ... more closely to the social problems that had
generated the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"). This rationale also explains, at least in
part, the Supreme Court's hesitancy to read a similar mandate into the Equal Protection Clause.
It does not explain, however, why the Court has read "intent" as narrowly as it has.
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as accommodation mandate is not easily drawn, and that fact may
serve as a strong justification for a stringent business necessity
requirement and, accordingly, a more sweeping scope of disparate
impact liability. As Professor Jolls explains, "[I]it is entirely obvious
that employers would often be able to come up with some sort of
legitimate business ground for their practices even when their motives
are in fact discriminatory."'1 15 A broader disparate impact liability, in
this view, is needed to "police underlying intentional discrimination
effectively.
' 116
It may also be possible to justify a more sweeping disparate
impact liability by reaching to the broader goal of social equality, as
many scholars have done. According to this view, the cost imposed on
employers is justified not because it is tied to employer wrong but
because it is the best way to further the goal of eliminating group
stigma and subordination in society. 117 One might argue, for example,
that disparate impact liability in a case like Griggs is justifiable
because it serves to remove longstanding barriers to people of color in
the workforce. This justification, however, requires at least some
consideration of whether other groups (other than employers) might
better bear that cost. 118
At the least, it should be clear from this discussion that
disparate impact liability in the latter circumstance, in the absence of
evidence of intent and in the face of a legitimate business reason for
using the neutrally applied practice, requires some justification for
imposing costs on the employer, rather than on some other entity,
whereas disparate impact liability in the former circumstance, while
open to empirical critique if it does not result in greater social
equality, does not. Of particular importance to the antidiscrimination
project, moreover, disparate impact liability in the latter circumstance
is likely to (and currently does) face greater political resistance than
disparate impact liability in the former. Courts have been largely
115. Jolls, supra note 67, at 676.
116. Id. at 675.
117. It is possible to rephrase this argument in terms of employer wrong. See, e.g.,
Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 858 ("Individual employers have a moral obligation to avoid
contributing to [a system of subordination and occupational segregation] because they are the
only ones who can take effective action against it .... "). The rephrasing highlights the
employer's role in creating and maintaining social inequality, but the wrong nonetheless inheres
solely in societal inequality.
118. There may, of course, be policy differences among accommodation mandates. The
United States government does not have a policy of providing social welfare to African
Americans or women or other protected groups who face barriers that operate to "freeze the
status quo" of inequality or segregation (unless those individuals fall below the poverty line or
are eligible for unemployment). The government does, however, have a longstanding policy of
providing extra benefits for disability-related unemployment.
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unreceptive to broad use of disparate impact theory, 119 and a robust
social antisubordination theory as the sole rationale for imposing costs
on employers has been less than wholly accepted.
3. Reasonable Accommodation Liability
In addition to imposing liability under the well-known theories
of disparate treatment and disparate impact, Title I of the ADA
imposes liability on an employer when it is shown that the employer
failed to make "reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability," unless the employer shows that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of its business.1 20 Like
disparate impact liability, this reasonable accommodation
requirement can, in some circumstances, impose an
antidiscrimination mandate, but in other circumstances it imposes an
accommodation mandate.
Specifically, the accommodation requirement of the ADA can
offset discriminatory bias and put individuals with disabilities on
equal footing with their similarly situated counterparts. At least some
case law suggests that employers regularly accommodate nondisabled
employees in various ways, but that those same employers frequently
will not provide similar accommodations to disabled employees.121 An
employer might, for example, permit nondisabled employees to arrive
late to work because of a routine doctor's appointment without any
119. The Supreme Court's construction of disparate impact theory in Wards Cove reveals its
discomfort with a disparate impact theory. For recent articles discussing the infrequent use of
disparate impact theory, see Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment
Discrimination, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597 (2004); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking
Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911 (2005).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(5)(A) (2007). Title I of the ADA is not the only equality-based
statute to require accommodation. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-j (2007) (requiring employers to
accommodate religious observance); 209 U.S.C. § 2612(a)-(c) (2005) (requiring employers to
accommodate caregiving activities). I use the ADA as the basis for analysis, but the analysis
should apply more broadly.
121. See Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 867-68 & n.135-36 (citing sources); Bagenstos, supra
note 2, at 16-17 (noting that accommodation requests to employers from disabled employees are
often seen as "unfair demand[s] for a special privilege"); Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially
Limited" Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and
Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REv. 409, 530-33 (1997) (arguing that
employers regularly make accommodations based on assumptions about employee
characteristics, and that these accommodations could just as easily be based on the
characteristics of disabled employees).
A similar bias has been identified in the gender and race context. See Joan C. Williams, The
Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases
and Defang the "Cluelessness" Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POLY J. 401, 415-16 (2003)
(describing a "leniency bias" that advantages the in-group).
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thought of "accommodation," but view a disabled employee's request to
arrive late for a reason associated with her disability as a request for
"special treatment." Similarly, an employer might provide additional
book shelves, flat-screen computer monitors, or docking stations for
laptops to nondisabled employees upon request, but refuse a disabled
employee's request for an accessible desk or chair. 122 In these cases,
the requirement that employers provide reasonable accommodations is
little more than a method of requiring equal treatment. The employer
is held liable when it fails to provide accommodations to disabled
individuals that it would provide to nondisabled individuals. 123
In other circumstances, however, the reasonable
accommodation requirement imposes costs on employers that are not
as easily tied to employer wrongdoing to individuals in the workplace.
When, for example, an employer is required to provide an interpreter
to facilitate communication between a severely hearing-impaired
employee and other employees, the ADA exacts a cost not unlike the
cost exacted in the disparate impact accommodation mandate
circumstance described earlier. The employer in this case bears a cost
for society's construction of a dominant communication system that
excludes severely hearing-impaired people. Similarly, when an
employer is required to retrofit a building to support wheelchairs, the
employer bears a cost for society's reliance on building standards that
exclude people who cannot climb stairs.
Again, like with the disparate impact accommodation mandate,
the line between accommodation requirement as antidiscrimination
mandate and accommodation requirement as accommodation mandate
is not always easy to draw in practice. Moreover, there may be strong
social justice and distributive reasons why antidiscrimination law, and
specifically employment discrimination law, should include an
accommodation mandate for individuals with disabilities. Professor
Michael Stein's recent argument that the reasonable accommodation
requirement of the ADA should be "grounded in equality theory" is
122. I draw these examples from Bagenstos and Burgdorf. Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 17;
Burgdorf, supra note 121, at 530-32. I should note that Professor Burgdorf goes further, arguing
that office features that are designed with nondisabled individuals in mind are
"accommodations" much like the accommodations required for disabled individuals under the
ADA. Burgdorf, supra note 121, at 531-33.
123. Although Professor Bagenstos recognizes this parallel between the mandate imposed by
the accommodation requirement of the ADA in this circumstance and the mandate imposed by a
structural approach, Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 16-17, he overlooks the distinction between the
mandate imposed in this circumstance (and the one imposed by a structural approach) and the
mandate imposed when the employer is applying a standard or requirement, even one socially




best understood in this way. 124 Professor Stein makes a compelling
case that the ADA employment accommodation requirement is
properly located within antidiscrimination law, where costs will be
borne by employers rather than crafted as an explicit tax-and-spend
program. Reaching to the end-goal of social justice, he argues that the
ADA accommodation requirement "appropriately remedi[es] historical
exclusion" of individuals with disabilities 125 and that it achieves that
goal by removing artificial barriers to employment at reasonable cost
and by effectuating change in the societal perception towards the
disabled. 126 But, despite his assertions to the contrary,127 the very
nature of Professor Stein's argument, one that considers alternative,
non-employer-based distributive approaches and justifies limits on
costs to employers as a matter of fairness rather than solely in light of
their implications for the end-goal of social equality, reveals that at
some point the ADA reasonable accommodation requirement crosses
over into the realm of accommodation mandate. At that point, it
requires additional justification and analysis that is not required for
antidiscrimination mandates tied to employer wrong.
128
Moreover, like with disparate impact, to the extent that the
ADA has been viewed as a "social welfare" Act, it has met substantial
political resistance. Many commentators read the Supreme Court's
exceedingly narrow definition of disability in that way. 29 And, as
124. Stein, supra note 4, at 664. Professor Burgdorfs argument that ADA accommodations
are fair and reasonable is also best understood in this way. See Burgdorf, supra note 121, at 533
(describing reasonable accommodation for individuals with disabilities as a "method for
eliminating discrimination that inheres in the planning and organization of societal
opportunities based on expectations of certain physical and mental characteristics").
125. Stein, supra note 4, at 602.
126. See id. at 649 (arguing that, "for reasons of both economic efficiency and prudential
propriety, ADA accommodations are more properly allocated as an antidiscrimination device
(whose costs are borne by employers) than as a subsidy program (where the expenses are paid for
by the state)").
127. See id. at 585-97 (arguing that the ADA accommodation requirement should be viewed
as a "pure" antidiscrimination provision); id. at 662 (denying that the ADA accommodation
requirement is a "redistribution device").
128. For an insightful discussion of the ADA's requirement of consideration of the interests
of nonclaimants as an example of how the ADA is consistent with communitarian theory, see
Carlos A. Ball, Looking for Theory in All the Right Places: Feminist and Communitarian
Elements of Disability Discrimination Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 105, 157-64 (2005).
129. See, e.g., Mathew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 23 (2000) (arguing that "the pattern of narrow and begrudging
interpretations of the ADA derives from the fact that the courts do not fully grasp, let alone
accept, the statute's reliance on a civil rights model for addressing problems that people with
disabilities face in the workplace"); Krieger, supra note 54, at 516 (noting that "the ADA's
definition of disability has come under such powerful narrowing pressure because people do not
understand that the ADA is an anti-discrimination statute rather than an entitlement
program"); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform,
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Professor Bagenstos has illustrated in his earlier work, courts and
other regulatory institutions interpreting the ADA have construed the
act narrowly in an effort to tie its requirements to employer wrong,
even one broadly defined as a wrong of contributing to social
inequality.
13 0
The political difficulty faced by disparate impact liability and
failure-to-accommodate liability as well as the additional justification
provided by scholars for including the theories within
antidiscrimination law make more sense once one understands that
each of those theories in some circumstances impose an
accommodation mandate. In the next Part, I situate a structural
approach, in contrast, as an antidiscrimination mandate.
III. SITUATING A STRUCTURAL APPROACH
Current pessimism concerning the political viability of a
structural approach stems from the assumption that a structural
approach aims to impose costs on employers for societal barriers to
employment. According to Professor Bagenstos, for example, a
structural approach to employment discrimination is analogous to an
ADA requirement that employers provide home-based personal
assistance to individuals with disabilities. 131 Bagenstos's view is
particularly extreme, 132 but it reflects a more widely held concern that
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 927 (2003) (arguing that the courts' narrow definition of disability
makes sense given that "the ADA was sold to a significant extent as a means of welfare reform").
130. Bagenstos, supra note 52, at 35-37 (describing the courts' and EEOC's interpretation of
the accommodation requirement as limited to "job-related" rather than "personal"
accommodations). The "job-related" rule, under which employers may be required to provide an
accommodation that "specifically assists the individual in performing the duties of a particular
job," but will not be required to provide "an adjustment or modification [that] assists the
individual throughout his or her daily activities, on and off the job," 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. §
1630.9 (2007), attempts to limit the employer's accommodation obligation to the obstacles that it
erects to employment of people with disabilities. Imposing an obligation on employers to provide
home-based personal assistance and transportation to work requires a different distributive
justification than imposing an obligation on employers to install ramps in a building with stairs
used or owned by the employer. When the employer is required to make changes to the work
environment, it is being asked to reduce its contribution to social subordination and inequality.
When it is asked to provide outside-of-work assistance, in contrast, it is being asked to alleviate
social subordination and inequality directly. Although Professor Bagenstos rightly points out the
"substantial indeterminacy" in the job-related rule as applied, Bagenstos, supra note 52, at 44-
45, he misses this distinction and fails to recognize its relevance to the policy-based, distributive
arguments for imposing these and other accommodation mandates on employers.
131. See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 3-4 n.9; id. at 43.
132. Professor Bagenstos cannot be right when he says that a structural approach to
employment discrimination law is analogous to an ADA requirement that employers provide
home-based personal services, for that analogy ignores the descriptive reality, which he does not
dispute, that structural discrimination is a problem of the interplay between individuals and
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by diverging from the paradigmatic story of discrimination, a
structural approach to employment discrimination law loses its
normative force.
In this Part, I explore the normative underpinning of a
structural approach that would impose an obligation on employers not
to facilitate discriminatory decisionmaking in the workplace. Taking
the normative and political divide between antidiscrimination and
accommodation mandates as a starting point, I argue that a structural
approach to employment discrimination law serves as an
antidiscrimination mandate, imposing costs that are tied to employer
wrong to individuals in the workplace. My argument is two-fold. In the
first Section of this Part, I take a closer look at the circumstances
described above in which existing antidiscrimination law imposes an
accommodation mandate on employers, and I make the case that a
structural approach is different from those uses of law because a
structural approach imposes costs for a workplace wrong. Structural
discrimination is a workplace wrong (as well as a societal wrong), I
argue, because it violates the long-standing norm against employment
decisions that are affected by protected group status or characteristics.
This is so regardless of the state of mind of the employer or of the
individual decisionmaker or decisionmakers involved. In the second
Section of this Part, I then turn more explicitly to the question of
fault. The empirical work that forms the foundation for a structural
approach illustrates that employers, as organizational actors, are
active, causal participants in the problem of structural discrimination.
A structural approach translates this descriptive reality into
normative obligation; it seeks to hold employers responsible for their
role in the wrong of structural discrimination. This normative vision is
workplace structures within which they work. As distributive measures, accommodation
mandates require a policy determination that the employer is best situated to redress the
particular social need. In most cases, the mandates are justified on the ground that the
disadvantage suffered by members of the protected group can be tied to an act of the employer.
Indeed, the existing accommodation mandate of the ADA has been justified by disability rights
advocates in largely that way. Framed frequently in terms of the employer wrong of contributing
to social inequality, the argument is that the design of the employer's facilities (and the
employer's act either in designing the facilities or in choosing to move into the facilities),
interacting with the inability of people who use wheelchairs to climb stairs, disadvantages
individuals with disabilities in employment, and employers should therefore bear some
reasonable cost in removing the barrier by redesign of its facilities. It is possible, however, to
have a law that imposes costs on employers without tying the mandate to an employer act. The
law could, for example, require that employers pay for home-based personal care for individuals
with disabilities so that they can get up and ready for work in the morning. The courts' and the
EEOC's adherence to a "job-related rule," supra note 130, illustrates the political difficulty in
doing so, but it is a possibility. Even if a structural approach were an accommodation mandate,
which I argue it is not, it would be an accommodation mandate of the former rather than the
latter type.
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consistent with law and scholarship concerning other forms of
organizational wrongdoing. In addition, it finds support in existing
Supreme Court case law and in empirical work on people's willingness
to hold organizations responsible for wrongdoing that is caused, in
part, by individuals. A structural approach to employment
discrimination law, by seeking to hold employers responsible for the
organizational role that they play in the different treatment of women
and people of color in their workplaces, therefore holds greater
political and normative traction than commentators have recognized.
In the third Section of this Part, I reinforce this point by exploring
how an expanded conception of a structural approach, to include
employer facilitation of disadvantaging behavior by outsiders as well
as facilitation of discriminatory bias in decisionmakers who act
against outsiders, crosses over into an accommodation mandate.
A. Structural Discrimination as a Workplace Wrong
The normative foundation for a structural approach to
employment discrimination law builds on the widespread
understanding that it is morally wrong to treat equally situated
employees differently because of race or other protected
characteristics. 133 The anticlassification principle, whether understood
in light of larger antisubordination goals or not,134 remains a firmly
rooted normative principle for most Americans. 135
133. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
74 TEX. L. REV. 1813, 1813 (1996) ("Title VII's prohibitions on discrimination based on race,
gender, religion, and national origin are typically justified on grounds other than economic
efficiency. These prohibitions reflect, for many of us, a basic normative judgment that different
outcomes for equally qualified employees of different races or other protected categories are
simply wrong .. "). In this way, a structural approach builds most directly on a norm of what
Professor Verkerke calls "negative equality," see Verkerke, supra note 82, at 1389 ("[T]he
principle of negative equality bars specific grounds for employment decisions that the law deems
illegitimate but otherwise leaves businesses free to manage their affairs as they wish."), while
recognizing that prohibiting structural discrimination is likely to impose real costs on employers.
134. Scholars have made a strong argument that the anticlassification principle cannot be
fully understood without reference to antisubordination. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown,
and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1711-12 (2005) (describing dangers
of adhering to the anticlassification principle without reference to antisubordination); Balkin &
Siegel, supra note 81, at 10 (arguing that "antisubordination values have shaped the historical
development of anticlassification understandings"); Siegel, supra note 81, at 1477 (arguing that
"antisubordination values live at the root of the anticlassification principle").
135. Although I am convinced that the anticlassification principle cannot (and should not) be
understood without reference to antisubordination, see supra note 134, and that achievement of
social equality requires more than formal equality, there is reason to believe that many
Americans currently adhere to an anticlassification principle that does not take into account
larger antisubordination goals. See Balkin, supra note 134, at 1711-12 (describing the
palatability of the anticlassification principle for whites). Resolution of this issue is important for
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Employment decisions that are tainted by implicit bias violate
this norm against different treatment. This is true whether one takes
an individualized or a structural approach to the problem of implicit
bias. From an individual perspective, if an employment decision was
infected by the racial biases of decisionmakers, that decision was
affected by race. Similarly, from a structural perspective, if an
employer has created an organizational context that facilitates
racially discriminatory bias in workplace decisionmaking, even with a
legitimate business reason for each of its structural choices, its
individual employment decisions are likely to be affected by race.
Importantly, the wrongfulness of the action here does not
depend on the state of mind of the employer or of any particular
decisionmaker. To be denied employment opportunities on the basis of
stereotypes or biases of workplace decisionmakers is to suffer an
incommensurable moral wrong, regardless of whether the employer in
structuring the workplace or the individual actors who acted on their
biases intended to wrongfully discriminate.' 36 The actor's intent in
making a decision influenced by discriminatory bias may be relevant
to a judgment of the blameworthiness of the actor,137 but what makes
the action itself wrongful is its violation of the anticlassification
norm.138
Unlike the costs imposed by accommodation mandates,
therefore, the costs imposed by a structural approach to employment
discrimination law are tied to a specific employment wrong: the wrong
of biased employment decisions based on protected group status or
characteristics. A structural approach is unquestionably concerned
defining the precise contours of the moral wrong, in particular for determining whether a
member of a traditionally privileged group (i.e., a white male) suffers a wrong when race is a
factor in workplace decisionmaking. However, because resolution of the issue is not necessary to
the argument that I make in this Article, I leave it for another day.
136. This is not true of all actions-to murder, for example, is by definition to "kill
wrongfully where part of what makes it wrongful derives from the culpable state of the actor"-
but it does seem true of classification. Deborah Hellman, It's Not the Thought that Counts 10 (U.
of Maryland Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 2005-43, 2005) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=741245.
137. The employer is morally blameworthy, for example, if it adopts a job requirement that
has the effect of screening out members of a protected group with the purpose of excluding
members of that group. In this circumstance, the employer has wrongfully discriminated by
judging others incorrectly "to be of less moral worth," Alexander, supra note 55, at 159, and by
acting on that judgment, even if the workplace wrong is largely expressive in nature. See
generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Wrong: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000) (a survey of expressivist theories).
138. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 55, at 182-83 (distinguishing between unconscious
biases that result in personal aversions and those that result in preferences for goods or
services). For an argument that intent is not relevant to the moral assessment of whether a
decision wrongfully discriminates, see generally Hellman, supra note 136.
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with the broader goal of attaining social equality, but the costs
imposed are aimed at minimizing the wrongful treatment of
individuals in the workplace.
The hypothetical variation on the Griggs case described above
serves to illustrate this point. The employer who adopts a high school
diploma requirement (with a legitimate business reason and no
discriminatory purpose) that has a disparate impact on African
Americans does not treat applicants differently on the basis of race;
instead, use of the requirement disadvantages African American
applicants because of the long history of subordination and
segregation in education in our country. If the employer has engaged
in a wrong, it can only be a wrong of contributing to social inequality.
A law that imposes costs on the employers in this circumstance may
be readily justifiable, but it is nonetheless an accommodation
mandate, for, unlike a structural approach, the costs imposed cannot
be tied to a wrong against individuals in the workplace.
13 9
It also helps to take a closer look at one of Professor Jolls's
examples of disparate impact as imposing an accommodation
mandate. Banks v. City of Albany involved a disparate impact
challenge to the Albany Fire Department's policy of subjective hiring
based on personal contacts and familial relationships. 140 In short, the
Fire Chief decided whom to hire based on whether he or other
firefighters in the all-white department knew the candidates
personally or were related to the candidates. 141 Professor Jolls argues
that, assuming no purpose to preserve the racial composition of the
fire department, if the fire department adopted this policy to
"maximize the effectiveness and long-term commitment of its
workforce," then imposing disparate impact liability in this case
imposes an accommodation mandate.
142
Instead of neutrally screening applicants, however, the Albany
Fire Department's policy, at least that portion that relied on the
139. The same is also true of behavioral expectations and "work cultures" developed along
racial and gender lines. Discriminatory work cultures, as I have argued elsewhere, are
frequently the product of employer-facilitated discriminatory bias. See Green, Work Culture,
supra note 1, at 646-50. A structural approach to employment discrimination law should,
therefore, have a beneficial effect on the development of discriminatory work cultures. Moreover,
because work culture itself is an on-going process of social interaction that is susceptible to the
influence of discriminatory bias, an employer's reliance on a discriminatory work culture is likely
to result in employment decisions that are affected by protected group status. The operation of
discriminatory bias within work cultures, therefore, sets discriminatory work cultures apart
from the disparate impact and ADA accommodation mandates involving static, neutrally applied
job requirements or environmental barriers.
140. Banks v. City of Albany, 953 F. Supp. 28 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
141. Id. at 33-34.
142. Jolls, supra note 67, at 658.
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existence of personal friendships, was likely to result in hiring
decisions that were based on race. Use of such a policy had the
potential to perpetuate stratification and exclusion in the fire
department not solely because society had erected barriers, such as
longstanding segregation and subordination for African Americans in
education or in residence, but because the fire chief and the
firefighters in the Albany Fire Department were likely to be racially
biased in their choice of friends. The fire department's policy simply
pushed the discriminatory bias to a more informal level of
decisionmaking. African American and white applicants were likely to
be treated differently in hiring decisions based on the biases of the
Albany Fire Department employees.' 43 The costs imposed by disparate
impact theory in this circumstance are tied to the employment wrong
of different treatment, and the law therefore serves as an
antidiscrimination rather than an accommodation mandate. 144
In this way, a structural approach is similar to the ADA
accommodation requirement that serves to put individuals with
disabilities on equal footing with individuals without disabilities, who
are frequently given special accommodations.' 45  The ADA
accommodation requirement in that circumstance corrects for the
wrong of different treatment of individuals by employers, thereby
imposing an antidiscrimination mandate. Only when the ADA
accommodation requirement loses its corrective component-for
example, when it requires accommodation for society's construction of
a physical environment that disadvantages individuals with
disabilities-does it become an accommodation mandate, triggering
additional analytical hurdles and greater political resistance.
Indeed, despite the ongoing academic debate concerning the
divide between disparate impact theory and disparate treatment
theory and the proper place of accommodation requirements within
antidiscrimination law, I expect that few commentators would deny
this point. Structural discrimination, to the extent that it results in
difference in treatment of similarly situated individuals in the
workplace because of race or other protected group status, is a
143. This case may be better described as a case of employer "capitalizing" on bias rather
than "facilitating bias." The employer is seeking to reap the benefits of greater social cohesion
among members of racial groups.
144. For a more detailed account of a similar process in the context of judges choosing jurors,
see Haney L6pez, supra note 54. For a more in-depth critique of the "cronyism" defense to
discrimination claims, see Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative
Action: A Critical Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision
Making Under Title VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003 (1997).
145. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (discussing reasonable accommodation
liability under the ADA).
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workplace wrong. The concern, instead, seems to be one of fault or
blameworthiness. Professor Bagenstos and others see employers-if
they see employers as distinct from individual decisionmakers at all-
as mere bystanders to the biases that employees bring in to the
workplace from outside. A law that imposes costs on employers in this
circumstance, the argument goes, asks employers to bear costs for
society's wrongs (socially instilled discriminatory biases) rather than
for the employer's own wrongs. In the next Section, I argue that this
concern is unfounded, both as a descriptive and a normative matter.
Employers as organizational actors are active, causal participants in
the wrong of structural discrimination, and prevailing norms
concerning organizational facilitation of individual acts of wrongdoing
suggest that employers should be held responsible for their role in
that wrong.
B. Structural Discrimination as an Employer Wrong
To conclude that employers should be held morally responsible
for the wrong of structural discrimination requires first that
employers, apart from the organizational superiors who make
decisions on behalf of the organization, be capable of being morally
responsible. The literature on corporate criminal liability informs this
threshold issue. 146 As Professor Lawrence Friedman has argued,
corporations, even if they do not possess a human capacity for shame,
have discrete identities and expressive potential that renders them
capable of suffering moral condemnation, "thereby vindicating the
proper valuation of persons and goods whose true worth was
disparaged by the corporation's conduct-just as in the case of an
individual wrongdoer."1 47 Employers, in other words, whether taking
corporate form or not, have distinct cultures and organizational
146. For a brief review of the current critiques and defenses of corporate criminal liability,
see Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us About
American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 97-104 (2004).
Corporations may be held vicariously liable for criminal actions of their agents. See New York
Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-96 (1908) (incorporating the civil
concept of vicarious liability into the corporate context). I draw here on the criminal liability
literature not to make an argument for criminal liability, but to make an argument for the
capacity for moral responsibility.
147. Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 833, 852 (2000). Similarly, Professor Pamela Bucy draws in her work on substantial
sociological research in the area of organizational wrongdoing to argue that corporations should
be criminally liable for the systems of social structures and internal organizational processes-
what she calls the corporate "ethos"-that encourage unlawful behavior. See Pamela H. Bucy,




structures that distinguish them from the individuals who act as their
agents.
Those same cultures and organizational structures that give
rise to distinct organizational "ethos" serve as the basis for employer
responsibility for the wrong of structural discrimination. As the
research that forms the empirical foundation for a structural approach
illustrates, employers (most often through organizational superiors)
make the structural decisions concerning decisionmaking systems,
distribution of power, organization of work, and makeup of leadership
and work groups, and those structural decisions necessarily shape the
context in which employment decisions are made.
1 48
In fact, there is some reason to believe that economic
incentives, at least in the short term, may drive employers to devise
organizational structures and work environments that facilitate
discriminatory bias. Employers today face pressure both to diversify
and to homogenize their workplaces. Civil rights laws and a strong
norm against discrimination encourage the hiring of visibly diverse
workers. In addition, a mass of popular business writing maintains
that diversity expands product reach to unserved markets, 149 and
empirical studies suggest that diversity can improve performance by
facilitating creativity in problem solving.150 At the same time,
however, as employers respond to these pressures to diversify by
hiring more women and racial minorities into their workplaces, they
face a competing pressure to homogenize. Scholars who study
organizational dynamics have long emphasized that employee
148. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text. This research illustrates that the
employer necessarily acts by creating the context for decisionmaking. I am wary, therefore, of
conceptualizations that cast the employer as a passive bystander, see, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, Is
Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POLY J. 459, 464-
65 (2003) (arguing that cognitive bias in workplace decisionmaking should be viewed as a
dangerous condition on land), particularly since this conceptualization seems to underlie the
pessimism concerning a structural approach. See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
149. Lauren Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J.
SOC. 1589, 1618-19 (2001).
150. See, e.g., Poppy Lauretta McLeod et al., Ethnic Diversity and Creativity in Small
Groups, 27 SMALL GROUP RES. 248, 256-57 (1996) (finding that ethnically diverse workgroups
produced higher quality ideas than all-Anglo groups). Most of the research supporting the "value-
in-diversity hypothesis" has been conducted in the laboratory or classroom setting. See Katherine
Y. Williams & Charles A. O'Reilly, III, Demography and Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of
Research, in 20 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 77, 79 (Barry M. Staw & L.L.
Cummings eds., 1998) (describing some of the limitations of the research). The added limitation




commitment is crucial to effective organizations. 15 1 Research suggests
that "affective commitment"-defined as commitment that involves
identification with the firm's goals and a desire to do what is best for
the organization-results in employee behavior that goes beyond
specific role requirements, behavior that positively correlates with
firm productivity.' 52 This research on the benefits of extra-role
behavior both drives the recent trend toward decentralized
decisionmaking and team-based work and heightens the
organizational need for strong workplace norms and employee
commitment. 53 Affective commitment, in other words, becomes not
just an institutional goal but a necessary means of employee control.
The task for employers seeking affective commitment, as one
organizational theorist explains, is to "find . . .means to convince
employees that they are in the same boat together."
154
With the organizational benefits of strong affective
commitment in mind, the connection between organizational theory
and the business incentive for facilitating discriminatory bias becomes
clear.1 55 A wealth of social science research and theory suggests that
discriminatory bias is a powerful tool for building self esteem and in-
group cohesion. Research on similarity-attraction theory and social
identity theory reveals, for example, that people are most comfortable
151. Carbado & Gulati, Law and Economics, supra note 42, at 1769, 1789 n.144 (citing
sources and providing an insightful exploration of how the "homogeneity incentive" is likely to
affect employee selection and racial identity).
152. See DENNIS W. ORGAN, ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR: THE GOOD SOLDIER
SYNDROME 105-06 (1988); John P. Meyer et al., Organizational Commitment and Job
Performance: It's the Nature of the Commitment that Counts, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 152, 152
(1989). For a discussion of recent organizational moves aimed at increasing firm flexibility and
attaining employee commitment, see KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:
EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 87-116 (2004).
153. See STONE, supra note 152, at 87; Green, Work Culture, supra note 1, at 634-43.
154. Janice A. Klein, The Paradox of Quality Management: Commitment, Ownership, and
Control, in THE POST-BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGE 178, 191 (Charles Heckscher & Anne Donnellon eds., 1994); see also PETER F. DRUCKER,
MANAGING IN A TIME OF GREAT CHANGE 71-72 (1995) (positing that management needs to instill
trust in employees).
155. See Frances J. Milliken & Luis L. Martins, Searching for Common Threads:
Understanding the Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organizational Groups, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
402, 420-21 (1996) (summarizing research suggesting that diversity "leads to serious affective
costs" and that "groups and organizations will act systematically to drive out individuals who are
different from the majority"). There may also be a personality dimension to this drive for
homogeneity. See Donald C. Langevoort, Overcoming Resistance to Diversity in the Executive
Suite: Grease, Grit, and the Corporate Promotion Tournament, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1615,
1630-31 (2004) (describing the economic bias toward "grease" over "grit" in managerial positions).
See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What
Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645 (2004) (examining the likely
personality traits of people of color who succeed in competitive environments).
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with those who are visibly similar to themselves, and that association
with visibly similar people raises self-esteem. 15 6 This, together with
research showing a predisposition to categorize along socially and
visibly salient lines, such as race and sex, suggests that the operation
of discriminatory bias in workplaces is likely to enhance affective
commitment, at least that of in-group members. 15
7
The idea that employers attain bottom-line benefits from the
operation of discriminatory bias (and thus have an incentive to at the
least ignore the risk of bias in workplace decisionmaking) is not new.
Scholars studying sexual harassment and other forms of hostile work
environment have long understood harassing behavior as an extreme
form of in-group entrenchment and solidarity.1 58 Even Professor
Richard Epstein's famous argument against antidiscrimination laws
rests on the economic benefits to firms of employee homogeneity. 159
According to Professor Epstein, homogeneity results in efficiencies in
156. See, e.g., Jim Sidanius et al., Peering Into the Jaws of the Beast: The Integration
Dynamics of Social Identity, Symbolic Racism, and Social Dominance, in CULTURAL DIVIDES:
UNDERSTANDING AND OVERCOMING GROUP CONFLICT 80, 82-89 (Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T.
Miller eds., 1999) (on social dominance theory); Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative
Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33, 40-43
(William G. Austin & Stephen Worchel eds., 1979) (on social identity theory). Additional research
suggests that people tend to focus on personal characteristics rather than job performance when
explaining reasons for trust. Carole V. Wells & David Kipnis, Trust, Dependency, and Control in
the Contemporary Organization, 15 J. Bus. & PSYCHOL. 593, 599-600 (2001).
157. Cf. David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, Tournaments, and
Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for "High-Level" Jobs, 33 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 66-67 (1998) (identifying costs of integrating minorities into the workplace
that derive from reluctance of "typical" workers to cooperate with minority workers). Facilitating
discriminatory bias is not the only way, or even the most organizationally effective long-term
way, to foster affective commitment. Research on team-based work suggests, in fact, that the
business case for diversity as a means of enhancing creativity in problem solving depends on
organizational minimization of relationship conflict and maximization of more productive task
conflict. See generally Karen A. Jehn, Managing Workteam Diversity, Conflict, and Productivity:
A New Form of Organizing in the Twenty-First Century Workplace, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 473
(1998) (discussing the importance of diversity and constructive conflict in the context of
workteam management). Nonetheless, successfully managing diversity to minimize relationship
or affective conflict requires commitment of long-term resources and attention to difference that
many organizations are likely to be reluctant to undertake. See generally Orlando C. Richard et
al., The Impact of Visible Diversity on Organizational Effectiveness: Disclosing the Contents in
Pandora's Black Box, 8 J. BUS. & MGMT. 265 (2002) (identifying business strategy, organizational
culture, and conflict management programs as variables that can increase the benefits of
diversity within an organization).
158. See, e.g., KANTER, supra note 37, at 221-24; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 155-58 (1979); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
159. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAwS 61-69 (1992). The problem with Professor Epstein's argument, of course,
is that it fails to recognize that women and people of color are likely to lose out in a workplace
that capitalizes on discriminatory bias.
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accommodating benign preferences, such as choice in music, in
addition to efficiencies derived from strong relational ties and
employee commitment.
From a normative perspective, however, capitalizing on
discriminatory bias to achieve affective worker commitment looks a lot
like building a business model based on the racial and gender
preferences of co-workers or customers, something that, except in
extreme circumstances, has not been tolerated. Existing
antidiscrimination law has consistently identified employer efforts to
cater to customer or coworker racial or gender preference as a wrong
targeted by antidiscrimination mandate. 160 Even the exception written
into the law for distinctions based on sex, religion, or national origin
has been construed narrowly to screen out the use of customer
preference as a means of obtaining a competitive edge. 161
Of course, organizational superiors are unlikely to make
organizational choices with the express purpose of facilitating
discriminatory bias in workplace decisionmaking. 62 But purpose has
never been the sole determiner of fault-worthiness. In the tort context
and even the criminal context, the law has long recognized theories of
recklessness and negligence.1 63  Moreover, laws regulating
organizational wrongdoing of other types, like environmental pollution
or securities fraud, do not require purposefulness on the part of the
organization in order to impose liability. The trend instead has been
toward greater organizational responsibility for the wrongdoing of
individuals acting within organizational context, in part because of
160. Some scholars locate the wrongfulness of the employer's action in this circumstance in
the wrongfulness of the customer's or coworker's preference, e.g., Kelman, supra note 62, at 847-
49, but, for reasons discussed infra, I find that problematic. See also Alexander, supra note 55, at
176 (suggesting that "the morality of one's treatment of reaction qualifications is not primarily a
function of the intrinsic morality or immorality of the reactions").
161. See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding
that business generated from sex appeal did not justify hiring only female flight attendants
under Title VII's bona fide occupational qualification defense ("BFOQ")); 110 CONG. REC. 13825
(1964) (describing the attempt by Senator McClellan to amend the BFOQ provision to permit
racial considerations in employment "when the employer believes, on the basis of substantial
evidence, that the hiring of such an individual of a particular race.., would be more beneficial to
the normal operations of his particular business or to its good will than the hiring of an
individual of another particular race").
162. A quick survey of the business literature reveals a number of reasons, unrelated to the
operation of discriminatory bias, why employers might decide to adopt structures that have the
potential to facilitate bias in decisionmaking. Flattened hierarchies, skill-based pay systems,
work teams, and subjective performance evaluations are all touted in the business literature as
ways of creating flexible institutions that better respond to an increasingly globalized and
information-based market. See PETER CAPPELLI ET AL., CHANGE AT WORK 29-32 (1997).
163. Criminal liability for negligence is a controversial issue. See, e.g., LARRY MAY, SHARING
RESPONSIBILITY 95-98 (1992) (summarizing the positions on both sides of the issue).
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the understanding that organizations create the incentive-structures
that can lead to wrongdoing. 164 Even as the law of organizational
liability has begun to recognize that the individuals who engage in
wrongdoing are not always rational, amoral actors,1 65 it has not
absolved organizations from responsibility for their role in creating
the context in which decisions are made. Quite to the contrary, the law
has shifted its focus more expressly onto the role of organizations in
facilitating wrongdoing by triggering cognitive illusions and other
human biases and on ways to structure the decisionmaking
environment to reduce those biases.
166
164. See generally Jennifer Arlen, Evolution of Corporate Criminal Liability: Implications for
Managers, in LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE FROM THE INSIDE OUT 191 (Robert Gandossy &
Jeffrey Sonnenfeld eds., 2004) (detailing a trend of increased corporate criminal sanctions).
165. Scholars in organizational theory and wrongdoing have been making this point for some
time. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and the
Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305 (2005) (relying on behavioral science
research to argue that judicial review of special litigation committees should not be limited to a
formal evaluation of their independence, but should also consider the quality of their
decisionmaking processes and the reasonableness of resulting decisions); Donald C. Langevoort,
Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors
(And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997) (relying on social science
research on human judgment and decisionmaking to explain why managers of a public
corporation would mislead stock market investors either in their SEC filings or in publicity
efforts); Vaughan, supra note 20 (arguing against a rational choice model for organizational
conduct and advocating a reorientation of regulatory activity toward the social context of
decisionmaking). For a discussion of the decision-theory model of corporations that builds on
some of this work, and implications of the model for the specifics of regulation, see Edward L.
Rubin, Images of Organizations and Consequences of Regulation, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
347, 352-57 (2005).
166. The Sarbanes-Oxley requirement of an outside audit board might be understood as a
measure informed by the literature on decision-making within organizations. Rubin, supra note
165, at 382-84; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 19-21. The Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines, as amended in 2004, also include consideration of whether the firm has an "Effective
Compliance and Ethics Program" as a factor for adjusting the criminal penalty imposed on an
organization. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5(f) (2004). And in the environmental
context, the EPA has designed administrative incentives for organizations to adopt special
"'environmental management systems' that can overcome common deficiencies in existing
routines." See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451,
459-60 (2003) (describing the need for intervention into systems and management routines to
reduce environmental violations). A number of scholars have also argued more broadly for a "due
diligence" defense to vicarious liability, what is sometimes called a "composite regime" of
liability, for organizations. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen et al., Organizational Justice: Recognizing
and Rewarding the Good Citizen Corporation, 21 J. CORP. L. 731 (1996); Developments in the
Law--Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanction, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 1227 (1979). It is important to note that the analogy to other forms of organizational
wrongdoing is not perfect. Indeed, because employment discrimination involves a wrong done to
individuals in the workplace, a strong argument can be made that a structural approach to
employment discrimination law should not be used to cut back on the existing vicarious liability
scheme. Cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (framing an affirmative
defense to vicarious liability). For a critique of the recent trend toward composite regimes, see
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST.
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Empirical work on prevailing norms in the area of
organizational wrongdoing also suggests that laypeople make
normative distinctions between individuals and the organizations
within which they act. In the mid-1990s, legal scholar Joseph Sanders
and sociologist V. Lee Hamilton conducted a study that measured
people's distribution of responsibility for wrongdoing within
organizations. Their data suggested that "[o]rganizations are held
most responsible when their policies and operations, implemented by
organizational superiors, suggest an internal decision structure that
leads to acts of wrongdoing."
167
Even the Supreme Court has expressed willingness to hold
employers responsible for the problem of structural discrimination. In
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, an African-American woman who
had been denied promotions at the bank on four separate occasions
sought to challenge the employer's decisionmaking system using
disparate impact theory.168 The bank relied on the subjective
judgment of its supervisors, who were all white, to evaluate
candidates for all hiring and promotions, and Watson argued that the
employer's use of this practice had a disparate impact on African
Americans because racial biases crept into the supervisors'
decisions.169
The Court held that disparate impact theory could be used to
challenge the employer's decisionmaking system. Writing for a
majority of the Court, Justice O'Connor reasoned that a system of
subjective decisionmaking may "in operation be functionally
equivalent to intentional discrimination."'' 70 In other words, the
employer's organizational choice to use a system of subjective
decisionmaking may be discriminatory because it results in different
U. L. REV. 571 (2005). The existing composite regimes in the employment discrimination context
can be further critiqued for focusing exclusively on organizational incentives for self-correction
rather than on contextual change. See Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765 (emphasizing antiharassment
policies); Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure:
Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment
Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2001) (questioning the empirical
foundation for reliance on antiharassment policies and diversity training); supra notes 15-21 and
accompanying text (reviewing empirical work on influence of context on bias in decisionmaking).
167. Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, Distributing Responsibility for Wrongdoing Inside
Corporate Hierarchies: Public Judgments in Three Societies, 21 LAW & SOC. INQ. 815, 853 (1996).
168. Watson v. Forth Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
169. Id. at 982.
170. Id. at 987. Justice O'Connor did not obtain a majority for that portion of her opinion in
which she reformulated disparate impact theory to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to
succeed. Later, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), a majority of the Court
did sign onto those views, and in 1991 Congress amended Title VII to overturn much of Wards
Cove. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
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treatment of individuals in the workplace. Justice O'Connor
recognized that the employer may not have adopted the system with
the purpose of facilitating different treatment-disparate impact
theory is well known for not requiring a showing of intent-and yet
she still assigned responsibility to the employer for its role as an
organizational actor in the wrong of different treatment. 171 She
explained:
It is true, to be sure, that an employer's policy of leaving promotion decisions to the
unchecked discretion of lower level supervisors should itself raise no inference of
discriminatory conduct. Especially in relatively small businesses . . . it may be
customary and quite reasonable to simply delegate employment decisions to those
employees who are most familiar with the jobs to be filled and with the candidates for
those jobs. It does not follow, however, that the particular supervisors to whom this
discretion is delegated always act without discriminatory intent. Furthermore, even if
one assumed that any such discrimination can be adequately policed through disparate
treatment analysis, the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would
remain . . . . If an employer's undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking has
precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional
discrimination, it is difficult to see why Title vII's proscription against discriminatory
actions should not apply.
17 2
For a variety of reasons, many of which I and others have
identified elsewhere, disparate impact theory in its current doctrinal
formulation falls short of addressing the problem of structural
discrimination. From a purely political/practical perspective, however,
Watson is evidence of the Supreme Court's willingness to hold
employers responsible for organizational choices that result in
employment decisions that are affected by race or other protected
characteristics, even when it was simultaneously seeking to cut back
on the reach of disparate impact doctrine.
173
171. Given her history in this area, Justice O'Connor was likely making an instrumental
argument rather than a normative one.
172. Watson, 487 U.S. at 990-91. In contrast to Watson, most recent cases involving
subjectivity in decisionmaking are brought as class actions, and allege disparate treatment. For
a recent example, see Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007). For an
examination of these cases as "structural disparate treatment" cases, see Green, Discrimination
in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 1 at 151-56, and an argument that they represent a new
form of private institutional reform litigation, see Green, supra note 15.
173. My argument elsewhere that structural discrimination is properly conceptualized as a
problem of different treatment was driven in part by the normative traction of anticlassification
and the political uncertainty surrounding disparate impact theory. See Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics, supra note 1 (arguing for a structural account of disparate treatment
theory); cf. Sullivan, supra note 119 (arguing for a structural approach through disparate impact
theory). My view is not that disparate impact theory holds no promise, but that structural
discrimination is better conceptualized as a problem of discriminatory bias that results in
different treatment in the workplace. See Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra
note 1, at 136-44. For an important article describing some of the difficulties of disparate impact
theory and arguing that the theory has had an unintended effect on our conception of intentional
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The question nonetheless is likely to arise: If the employer does
not intend to facilitate discriminatory bias, is the employer any more
fault-worthy when it adopts structures that facilitate bias in
workplace decisionmaking than it is when it adopts a job requirement
that interacts with societal wrongs to perpetuate social inequality? My
response to this question takes us back to the nature of the wrong and
the employer's responsibility for that wrong. Employers are under a
moral imperative to refrain from facilitating the wrong of biased
workplace decisionmaking. That moral imperative does not extend, at
least not unqualifiedly, to an employer's contribution to societal
inequality. As I have said before, I think a strong argument (even a
moral one) can be made that employers should avoid contributing to a
system of social subordination and occupational segregation, 174 but
that argument is one of how best to address societal wrongs and
maximize social welfare rather than one of correcting for or preventing
employer wrongs to individuals in the workplace.
Several commentators have expressed a related concern that
the bias at play in structural discrimination at the individual level is
likely to be unconscious or implicit rather than conscious and overt.
The concern here seems to be practical as well as normative: that it
will be difficult to convince factfinders of the prevalence of unconscious
bias, or to convince them to hold employers liable for the operation of
that bias. 175 This concern, however, even assuming an empirical
foundation, 176 conflates the individual with the employer wrong. The
employer wrong in structural discrimination lies less in the individual
discrimination, see Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 701 (2006).
174. Indeed, this is the argument that Professor Bagenstos makes. See Bagenstos, supra note
4, at 837-38.
175. Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 42-43 ("If antidiscrimination law is to respond to [implicit]
bias effectively, the concept of wrongful discrimination must expand to embrace not only the
deviant acts of especially immoral people but also the everyday actions of virtually all of us.");
Sullivan, supra note 119, at 951 (arguing that under a structural approach experts will "not only
need to remind or convince the factfinder that discrimination is still prevalent, but will also need
to educate the factfinder that social science research suggests that all of us-judges and jurors
included-may be biased without knowing it"). This same concern seems to underlie Professor
Michael Selmi's recent effort to define the realm of "subtle" discrimination narrowly. See Selmi,
supra note 2.
176. I have seen no offer of empirical support for the proposition that people are unwilling to
accept that they may harbor discriminatory biases generally (as contrasted with specific
situations); nor have I seen empirical work suggesting that people find different treatment based
on unconscious bias normatively acceptable. To the contrary, at least on the latter proposition,
the research suggests that people adhere to an egalitarian ideal, rather than simply a norm
against decisions based on conscious animus. See, e.g., John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner,
On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of Aversive
Racism, in CONFRONTING RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 3 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt &
Susan T. Fiske eds., 1998) (on aversive racism).
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decisionmaker's action than in the employer's structuring of a work
environment that facilitates bias in the individual decisionmaker's
action. 177 The existence of unconscious or subtle bias of employees is
not itself the fault of the employer (any more than the conscious
animus of employees is the fault of the employer in the traditional,
conscious bias story). Instead, the argument is that employers are
responsible for their causal role in the moral wrong of different
treatment in the workplace. Work, as others have argued, is quickly
becoming a "fundamental attribute of modern citizenship,"' 178 and
exclusion or denial of success by an employer on the basis of a
protected characteristic holds particular normative weight.179
For this reason, a structural approach to employment
discrimination law may be more viable in the current political climate
than a move toward a causation inquiry in individual disparate
treatment law. 180 Drawing on the substantial social science research
regarding the persistence of implicit biases, a number of scholars have
argued for a reformulated individual disparate treatment doctrine
that would focus on the issue of causation rather than on the state of
mind of discriminators. 18' These scholars argue, rightly I think, that
the wrong suffered is the same whether the individual discriminator
acted on the basis of conscious or unconscious bias. Nonetheless, a
shift toward causation as the sole inquiry in an individual disparate
177. See Philip Pettit, Responsibility Incorporated (unpublished draft on file with author)
(arguing that "it can be perfectly proper to hold the corporate entity responsible, even though
none of the individuals involved did any great personal wrong").
178. Sturm & Gunier, supra note 46, at 1031. For an extensive discussion of the role of work
in democratic citizenship, see CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE BONDS
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003).
179. For an argument that employers should be held liable under a theory of negligence, see
David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993).
180. There are other reasons why a structural approach to employment discrimination law is
needed, even if the law moves toward a causation inquiry in individual disparate treatment
theory. See Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 1 (arguing that structural
account of disparate treatment is needed to fill doctrinal gaps and to conceptualize the problem
of structural discrimination, or discrimination in workplace dynamics).
181. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 17, at 1242 (proposing that to establish liability a plaintiff
should be required to prove only that his or her group status "played a role in causing the
employer's action or decision"); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of
Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 289 (1997) ("What the Court means by intent is that
an individual or group was treated differently because of race. Accordingly, a better approach is
to concentrate on the factual question of differential treatment. In this way, the key question is
whether race made a difference in the decisionmaking process, a question that targets causation,
rather than subjective mental states."); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming
of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 957 (1989) ("A court applying the discriminatory intent
standard should ask: suppose the adverse effects of the challenged government decision fell on
whites instead of blacks, or on men instead of women. Would the decision have been different? If
the answer is yes, then the decision was made with discriminatory intent.").
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treatment case is open to critique from those unwilling to place blame
on individuals for their unconscious biases.18 2 By focusing inquiry on
the individual actor, a causation approach to individual disparate
treatment law suggests (though it does not require) that the wrong of
the employer in structural discrimination is the same as the wrong of
the individual actor.18 3 Once the actors are conflated in this way, it
becomes difficult to hold the employer morally responsible without
first concluding that the individual who was influenced by
discriminatory bias was acting wrongfully.
The same is not true of a structural approach. Under a
structural approach to discrimination, one can accept that implicit
biases have been "programmed into our brains by overarching societal
influences"18 4 and at the same time expect employers to refrain from
creating work environments that facilitate the operation of those
biases in workplace decisionmaking and make it more likely that
employment decisions will be influenced by those biases. A structural
approach, in other words, holds normative force both in the wrong of
different treatment in employment on the basis of membership in a
protected group and in the employer's role as an organizational actor
in facilitating that wrong.
Equally important, the normative underpinning of a structural
approach does not rest exclusively on the employer's causation of
group-based harm. Facilitating discriminatory bias in workplace
decisionmaking is normatively wrong, as I have argued, because
individuals are treated differently in the employment relationship on
the basis of membership in a protected group. This identification of an
individual harm that is distinct from any group harm fits a structural
approach within the dominant, individualistic account of
discrimination.1 8 5 A court need not consider the relative treatment of
182. The reasoning seems to be that people can't be expected to distinguish between
unconscious bias operating in the employment context and unconscious (or conscious) bias
operating in social or personal contexts, where some degree of bias may be acceptable or at least
where the moral rights of discriminators may be implicated. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 55,
at 204.
183. A focus on causation in individual disparate treatment theory might be viewed as a
particular regulatory scheme that takes a structural approach. By imposing liability on
employers for each employment decision that is affected by race or sex, regardless of the nature
of the bias behind the decision, individual disparate treatment theory would create an incentive
for employers to reduce the operation of bias, implicit as well as explicit, in workplace
decisionmaking.
184. Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 43.
185. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1663, 1718-28 (2001) (discussing the Court's discomfort with aggregate rights for which we
can only decide if the right is violated by looking at the relative treatment of different groups);
Primus, supra note 109, at 554 (recognizing that "modern doctrine has... promoted a view on
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groups in determining whether an employer has engaged in the wrong
of structural discrimination-the harm, in contrast, is to individuals
in the employment relationship, regardless of the overall effect of that
treatment on the group as a whole.
C. Crossing into Accommodation
A structural approach as I have described it so far-focusing on
employer facilitation of discriminatory bias in decisionmakers who act
against outsiders-clearly falls within an antidiscrimination mandate.
It is possible, however, to conceive of a structural approach that would
also include employer facilitation of disadvantaging behavior by
outsiders.18 6 In this Section I explore this expanded conception of a
structural approach and recognize its potential to cross over into an
accommodation mandate. This exploration locates space within which
a structural approach might impose an antidiscrimination mandate in
some circumstances and an accommodation mandate in others,
without wholly abandoning the normative distinction between the
two.
Scholars have recognized for some time that organizational
context can influence the choices and behavior of people of color and
women as well as facilitate bias in decisionmaking against members of
those groups. Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have made a
strong case that workplace inequality is perpetuated in certain
organizational contexts by the "extra identity work" and risky or self-
defeating signaling strategies adopted by members of minority
groups.18 7 According to one facet of this work, members of minority
groups, because they are likely to perceive themselves as subject to
negative stereotypes, are likely to feel the need to do more "identity
work" to counter those stereotypes, and that extra work can be risky
and time-consuming. 188
which we prohibit intentional discrimination as a matter of defending individual dignity, without
regard to questions of hierarchy and social structure").
186. I use the terms "insider" and "outsider" very loosely here, for lack of better terms. I
recognize, however, that bias can inhere across groups. See, e.g., Brian A. Nosek et al.,
Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP
DYNAMICS 101, 105 (2002) (showing, for example, that Blacks can exhibit an implicit bias against
Blacks).
187. See Carbado & Gulati, Law and Economics, supra note 42, at 1817 (describing the
vulnerability of members of minority groups who shed their racial identity to assimilate with
particular institutional cultures); Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 42, at 1262
(indicating that extra identity work results in significant opportunity losses and entails a high
level of risk for outsiders); Charny & Gulati, supra note 157, at 82 (describing the incentive for
minorities to adopt non-average signaling strategies).
188. Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 42, at 1262.
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Structuralist scholars in the area of gender have made a
similar argument. Rosabeth Moss Kanter's work on the aspirations of
women in the bureaucratic firm of the 1970s and Professor Vicki
Schultz's more recent work on the formation of women's preferences
illustrate that women do not form their preferences in a social
vacuum, independent of the work force or specific work
environments.1 8 9 And I have argued elsewhere that employers should
be expected to take structural measures to redefine work cultures,
whether formal or informal, that are drawn along racial or gender
lines, in part because of the detrimental effect that those work
cultures are likely to have on the success of women and people of
color. 190
Because much of insider and outsider behavior is likely to be
interactional rather than unilaterally responsive, 191 a structural
approach to employment discrimination law that focuses on
facilitation of discriminatory bias in decisionmaking against outsiders
should, as a practical matter, capture facilitation of outsider behavior
as well. People of color may perform extra identity work, for example,
because prevailing prescriptive stereotypes put them at a
disadvantage as compared with their white counterparts. 192 As a
structural approach is construed to include an independent obligation
not to facilitate disadvantaging behavior by outsiders, however, the
mandate begins to seem more like an accommodation mandate. In
other words, the problem being addressed becomes less one of
discriminatory bias operating in the workplace to the disadvantage of
members of certain groups and more one of disadvantage that results
from the interplay between workplace structures and societal
expectations (or, in some cases, inherent differences) of members of
certain groups.
Take, for example, the famous Sears Roebuck case. 193 There,
the employer argued, and the court accepted, that significant
disparities in the numbers of women in commission and non-
189. KANTER, supra note 37; Schultz, supra note 39.
190. See Green, Work Culture, supra note 1 (arguing that employers should be expected to
take structural measures to redefine work cultures, whether formal or informal, that are drawn
along racial or gender lines).
191. See Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Interactions at Work: Remembering David Charny,
17 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 13, 18 (2001) (arguing that "extra identity work" required of
outsiders is a form of different treatment: it is required of members of certain groups and not of
others based on stereotypes held by insiders).
192. See id. at 19-20 (arguing that employers are more likely to ask outsiders to perform
time-consuming citizenship tasks that inhibit success, and are more likely to accept these tasks
as a result of pressure to disconfirm stereotypes).
193. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
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commission jobs at Sears could be explained by women's lack of
interest in the higher paying sales commission jobs. This, of course, is
not the whole story. As Professor Schultz details in her work, social
science research reveals that women's interest in jobs like the sales
commission jobs at Sears is influenced and framed by Sears' (and
other employers') structuring and description of those jobs.194 Putting
aside the interactional nature of a "competitive" requirement and the
likelihood that Sears' description of the jobs in question would result
in discriminatory bias against women (who are presumed not to be
interested in the jobs), both of which should be captured by a
structural approach that focuses on discriminatory bias against
outsiders, forcing change in the requirement of competitive traits or
behavior imposes an accommodation mandate. If there is some
correlation between "competitive" traits or behavior and success in
commission sales jobs at Sears, in other words, then the disadvantage
that women face at Sears derives from their reaction to the
''competitive" in light of the socially-instilled stereotype that women do
not or should not exhibit competitive traits or behavior.
One might argue that employer facilitation of disadvantaging
behavior by outsiders, much like employer facilitation of biased
decisionmaking by insiders, results in workplace decisions that are
affected by group membership and therefore that an obligation not to
facilitate disadvantaging behavior by outsiders imposes an
antidiscrimination mandate. If a female employee or applicant at
Sears, faced with Sears' segregated work force and stereotypical job
descriptions, is less likely to express interest in a commission sales
position than her equally situated male counterpart, then gender has
affected the employment decision of whom to place in that position.
The employer wrong, in this account, lies in the employer's role in
perpetuating workplace segregation and subordination through
facilitation of disadvantaging behavior.
But this is true of all existing employer obligations under
antidiscrimination law. It is always possible, in other words, to
reframe employer wrong in terms of the perpetuation of workplace
segregation and the employer's contribution to a system of society-
wide subordination; otherwise, there would be little justification for
imposing an obligation, even an accommodation mandate, on
employers.' 95 Indeed, this is exactly the argument that disability-
rights scholars make when they argue that the interplay between
194. Schultz, supra note 39.
195. The exception to this might be imposing costs for home-based personal assistance. This
is why I assert that Professor Bagenstos's view of a structural approach is particularly extreme.
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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workplace structures and individuals frames our conceptions of ability
and difference. 196 For this reason, I define a structural approach as an
effort to alter the organizational structures that facilitate
discriminatory bias in workplace decisionmaking, with the
understanding that the employer obligation is likely to be construed to
include only discriminatory bias in insider decisionmaking against
outsiders, 197 but with confidence that a solid argument can be made
that a structural approach should be construed to impose this narrow
accommodation mandate as well.
CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to set the normative foundation for a
structural approach to employment discrimination law, an approach
aimed at reducing biased decisionmaking against members of
protected groups by changing the structures and environments within
which individuals work. A structural approach is a crucial component
of an effective system of antidiscrimination law and, contrary to recent
commentary, one that fits well into existing norms against workplace
discrimination. In setting the normative foundation for a structural
approach, I do not attempt to devise a precise regulatory scheme, nor
do I address any of the very real concerns about the efficacy in practice
of any such scheme. 198 These issues, together with many others, will
be left for another day. Moreover, although this Article is
unquestionably bold in its attempt to reclaim the normative core of
antidiscrimination law, I do not intend to sound a death knell for
accommodation mandates, or to put the brakes on any success in
conceptualizing accommodation mandates as equality concerns.
Indeed, I am persuaded by many of the arguments that employers
should bear reasonable costs to avoid contributing to social inequality.
But only by recognizing the normative core and political stress points
of employment discrimination law can we begin to devise a
comprehensive and workable solution to the problems of
discrimination, occupational segregation, and inequality-in the
workplace and in society. A structural approach to employment
196. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (recognizing that courts are likely to construe
employment discrimination law to impose antidiscrimination mandates). There is also a risk that
imposing any accommodation mandate at all, even a narrow one, will affect the political viability
of a structural approach. Interpreting a structural approach to include only facilitation of
discriminatory bias in workplace decisionmaking against outsiders eliminates that risk.
198. I have addressed some of these concerns in other work. See Green, supra note 15.
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discrimination law, sitting firmly as an antidiscrimination mandate, is
a step in that direction.
